Different+definitions+for+learning+online+one+as+Social+constructivism+and+two+as+actor+network+theory

 learning as bringing the world "out there" to a mind “in there” as a text of specialized languages and literacies (e.g. the language of specific subjects suchlearning as creating and attending to a or the meaning of representations of the world not the world itself but by a reading mostly texts – still Dianne ||  ‘learning as knowing through (re)presentation of the world “out there” tothe mind “in here”’ (Fenwick & Edwards, 2011, p. 722). Textualities recognize therole of specialized languages and literacies (e.g. the language of specific subjects suchas science) and attend to meaning rather than physical matter. ||  ||
 * TERM || Social Constructivist meaning || ANT meaning ||
 * Learning as self transformation ||  ||   ||
 * Learning as representation transfer
 * Learning as relationality Dianne || Bringing relationality into analytic view and drawing on concepts from ANT (Edwards & Miller, 2007, p. 269)

 A semiotic definition of materiality is in play: materiality is a product of relations between entities which thereby achievetheir material form. In the terms of ANT, it is an effect of unfolding relations; an emergent result.

. ||  ||
 * Learning as effect of things

possibly a "transfer" or a travelling of the assembled together things that include the material, the social and the textual as assembled that together in association or by connection through what proximity? intention? random association = knowledge making || materialities, socialities and textualities as the means of scientificknowledge making, indeed as ‘technologies’ of this knowledge making. I propose inturn that the process of transfer is variously social, material and textual. Socialities,textualities and materialities are microsites of knowledge. ||  || effect of the materialites of microsites or materialites of things || Guided by this ‘connective’ conception of learning transfer, and takingthe relational style of reasoning outlined above into account, I turn now to my empirical analyses Her thinking about learning transfer is organized through categories of a typology firstput forward by the sociologists of scientific knowledge Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985) in a historical study describing the origins of experimental science.They proposed materialities, socialities and textualities as the means of scientificknowledge making, indeed as ‘technologies’ of this knowledge making. I propose inturn that the process of transfer is variously social, material and textual. Socialities,textualities and materialities are microsites of knowledge. Attending to these microsites——inThrift’s (2000) terms the little things——induces an attentiveness to things,their agency and, indeed, their vibrancy (Bennett, 2010). These three microsites are not distinct; their workings depend on one another.Socialities point to social arrangements and institutions, the categories of usual sociologicalinterest, as well as social interactions and processes such as belonging ||  || Pedagogy, Culture & Society Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2012, 9–27  2012 || ‘Evidence is building that indicates that the potency of quality teaching is not restricted to pedagogical techniques solely concerned with subject content and academic processes, but that its efficacy also lies in attending to the affective dimension of teaching and learning’ (Lovat 2010, 491).
 * Learning as connectivity Dainne || (possibly Sorensen 2009,p. 177, original emphasis) claims that the materiality of learning ‘concerns how learning connects to other entities’——to other spaces, other persons, and other forms ofknowledge——and, significantly for present purposes, that this materiality ‘is comparableto what is usually known as “learning transfer”’ ||  ||
 * Learning as materialities, socialties and textualities
 * Dianne Learning as affect of materials

Attending to this dimension affords not only a strong sense of teacher subjectivity, but also of bodily matter, in the pedagogic practices of contemporary school classrooms. A focus on bodily matter in educational practice is important in the present educational-political conjuncture where means-ends rationality via ‘objective’ measures (e.g. standardised testing) rules (Au 2011). ||  || countered by her by following this focus on subjectivity with || It has the potential to challenge the liberal notion of the self-contained individual which is widely held in education and to address issues of change and transformation in classrooms. It affords recognition of the idea that materiality is governed by relations of indeterminacy, contingency and openness (Blackman 2008) and that far from being passive or inert, matter is a lively force that actively participates in events (Bennett 2010). ||  || Link betwwen material facts and socia ones Materiality, Form, and Context: Marx contra Latour Hylton White victorian studies / Volume 55, no. 4 June 1, 2013 P.668 || The primary goal for ANT is to show how assorted nonhuman actors— material things, particularly—participate in creating complex networks or assemblages of action that cannot be understood as products of purely human agency.2 ANT aims to reconsider the interplay between forms of materiality, forms of connection, and forms of action: precisely the domain in which critical theory has staked its preeminence. For Latour, therefore, the turn to ANT is inseparable from a turn away from critique—a turn he has charted most famously in his 2004 essay, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” In calling on us to renounce critique, and to rethink the entanglements of material objects in modes of association and action, Latour insists that critical theory has fallen short in understanding the links between material facts and social ones. T ||  || http://twelve.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-084-who%E2%80%99s-afraid-of-technological-determinism-another-look-at-medium-theory/ || As Bruno Latour observes, a polemical ‘social determinism’ arguing, for example, that the steam engine was the ‘mere reflection’ of ‘English capitalism’, is no less extreme and one-sided a view as the technological determinism it seeks to contest (2005: 84). || One of several ‘sources of uncertainty’ associated with ANT, in Latour’s view, was the theory’s assertion that ‘objects too have agency’ (63): technologies are considered ‘actors’ within particular networks, along with human agents. ANT is not afraid to assess ‘the many entanglements of humans and non-humans’ (84), yet these encounters occur within a modeling that explicitly ‘keeps the social flat’ (165). There is a flattening out of all actors – human and technological – within ANT, which is committed to focusing on the network rather than individual agents. The association is the thing; all individual elements, whether particular machines or human operatives, are devalued within this model. Within this flattening out of agents, the intrinsic properties of individual technologies are lost, or at least de-emphasised. This leveling of the technological and the social means that ANT is of little use in evaluating the specificity of each technology, including media technologies. The unique properties of each device – what the technology brings to a system or an interaction with human agents – are effectively erased. This certainly avoids a technological determinist perspective, yet it also leaves technologies stripped of their unique qualities. <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,'Lucida Grande',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 12px; vertical-align: baseline;">Ultimately, ANT shares characteristics of other theoretical models that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, including Foucault’s theory of power and various post-structuralist theories of association and assemblage. These characteristics include a post-human concentration on the network, flow or system. Leo Marx has argued that such models bear ‘strikingly close affinities’ to the ‘functioning of large technological systems’. Power is decentralized, flowing endlessly through society like ‘information through a communications network’ (1994: 24). Each model relegates or erases human agency within the greater network. While ANT cannot be conflated with the various forms of post-structuralism, its model reduces the role of technologies to the status of human actors. || Sian Bayne (2015) What's the matter with ‘technology-enhanced learning’?, Learning, Media and Technology, 40:1, 5-20, || Technological variety and multiplicity are generally ‘black-boxed’ in these accounts: part-defined at best, sealed-off from interrogation via vague and homogenising terms, such as ‘ICT’ or ‘online facility’ technology, are then positioned firmly as being ‘in service’ to the demands of the prior social activities of learning and teaching. This bracketing-off of technology from social activity is expressive of a more fundamental division of society from technology which is widespread within the field of digital education. By casting technology as being simply about the ‘enhancement’ of existing practices – in other words, as separable from social practice and ‘in service’ to it – we execute what Hamilton and Friesen (2013) have described as an elision of ‘a fuller understanding of technologies as social objects’ (3). ||  || Learning, Media and Technology, 40:1, 5-20, || Hamilton and Friesen (2013) construct a strong critique of online education research from the perspective of science and technology studies, describing it as being overly dependent on two simplistic, ‘common-sense’ understandings of the nature of technology: the essentialist and the instrumentalist. Where essentialism attributes to technology a set of ‘inalienable qualities’ immanent to the technological artefact (1), instrumentalism constructs technology as a set of neutral entities by which pre-existing goals (for example, ‘better’ learning) can be achieved. In both cases, Hamilton and Friesen argue, technology is cast as being independent of its social contexts, constructed as ‘an independent realm of pure technical and scientific law, unsullied by the differences, values or interests that typify the social world’ (20). ||  ||
 * Affordance of subjectivity in Dianne immediately
 * Things not the product of human agency
 * Determinism
 * Bayne ICT in the service of education or humans
 * Sian Bayne (2015) What's the matter with ‘technology-enhanced learning’?,
 * || <span style="font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; font-size: 16px;">positioning the ‘material’ and technological as separate from and subordinate to social practice; however, it also introduces a deeper critique of the failure of much educational research to give a proper account of the human subject and how it is constituted in intimate relation to its material contexts. Sociotechnical or sociomaterial approaches work against the isolation of society from technology, and human subject from non-human object, revealing how each is constituted by the other: they also problematise our dependence on certain conceptions of what it means to be human, suggesting that ‘human’ functions (like learning) are not pre-existing attributes of the individual separable from its social and material contexts, but are rather brought into being via a complex assemblage of the human and the non-human: Learning is an effect of the networks of the material, humans and non-humans, that identify certain practices as learning, which also entails a value judgement about learning as something worthwhile. This teaching is not simply about the relationships between humans, but is about the networks of humans and things through which teaching and learning are translated and enacted. (6) ||  ||
 * Autonomy || Ward and Parr 2010 in student Lei gENZOLA 2010 IN Lin what and how to learn (even though in collaboration) ||  ||
 * Efficiency || Grey et all 2007 Langualge learning efficiency Li Walsh 2010 Antoniazzi 2012 Effiency in assessment ||  ||
 * Collaboration || Dianna and Mihaela 2014 better performance and interactions within teams ||  ||
 * Student centred || Higgins and Mosely 2001 in studnt lIN ||  ||
 * Network || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">In contrast to Castells he is in favour of retaining social units individual/ family/ organisation) for analysis. One of the interesting arguments developed by Van Dijk is his explanation for apparent increasing individualisation evident in modern high-tech societies. In this context he sees the rise of individualism as the counterpoint to the increasing pervasiveness of the network i.e. the levelling of accessibility for each individual connected in a network. The potential uniformity leads to a social demand for the individual to differentiate, we are all on facebook but each page is unique- “generalization and standardization of the social environment meet the opposing trends of particularity and cultural differentiation”. (p. 175). ||  ||
 * Easy to use and the double click || <span style="font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; font-size: 14.6667px;">here of Carvelho and Goodyear (2014) as reference; to encourage user uptake, the technology must be appealing and easy to use. He has designed his website with this in mind.

<span style="font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; font-size: 14.6667px;">Carvalho, L., & Goodyear, P. (2014). //The architecture of productive learning networks// / edited by Lucila Carvalho and Peter Goodyear: New York Routledge, 2014 ||  || teacher || Badia, A., Meneses, J., & Sigalés, C. (2013). Teachers' perceptions of factors affecting the educational use of ICT in technology-rich classrooms. //Percepción de los docentes sobre los factores que afectan el uso educativo de las TIC en el aula equipada de tecnología., 11//(3), 787-807. doi: 10.14204/ejrep.31.13053 ||  ||
 * The double click ||  ||   ||
 * Six <span style="font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; font-size: 14.6667px;">of six characteristics that influenced teachers’
 * 2 level structure Latour || <span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;">The poison of the global that immediate shift to the higher level structiure without staying at the local level or at monism or mundane - tragedy of the common if you have two level standpoint - we borrow the association of religion not just an association but an all powerful force a god at the tiller dircting asn steering - the myth of the machine - engineers do not believe in this myth the difficulties of getting the mundane to do things is not easy

<span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;"> (2013 Latour: 20) the proclaimed him "Pluralism in representations, monism of being" the Modern overcome and bridge the gap between theory and practice or experience and playing experience to the alternatives, both in what is said, and to make the DONE attentive and so together to establish new modes of representation. Particularly basic structuring of the Modern in domains and the associated method to //<span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;">double click //<span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;"> to deconstruct and //<span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;">modes of existence //<span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;"> permit and, for example, reference [REF] and reproduction [REP] within networks [NET], the complex description of a plurality. ||  || all ‘action possibilities’ latent in an environment, where the potential uses of a given object arise from its perceivable properties and always in relation to the actor’s capabilities and interests (because perception in always selective).James Gibson (1979)perception and action
 * Reduction as two level structure leading to affordance || [|[2]] This anthropological project, with strong roots in pragmatist philosophy, is a thorough undoing of the modern divide of the subject and object, showing the ways in which this reduction obscures our relations with each other and the world, even within and for our own espoused values. And it is only by taking stock of our values that we can begin to compose the kinds of politics that will be necessary to move from modernization to ecologization. ||  ||
 * Affordance || http://multimodalityglossary.wordpress.com/affordance/

in relation to the design of objects, and Norman (1988) emphasizes social, as well as material aspects. Adapted by Kress (e.g. 2010), the term ‘modal affordance’ has particular currency in multimodality. It refers to the potentialities and constraints of different modes – what it is possible to express and represent or communicate easily with the resources of a mode, and what is less straightforward or even impossible – and this is subject to constant social work. From this perspective, the term ‘affordance’ is not a matter of perception, but rather refers to the materially, culturally, socially and historically developed ways in which meaning is made with particular semiotic resources.

Kress, G. (2010) //Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication// London: Routledge

http://culturedigitally.org/2012/01/affordances-technical-agency-and-the-politics-of-technologies-of-cultural-production-2/ <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">Affordance theory asserts a number of things, but I’d focus on its claims that technologies produce fields of action(including unexpected actions), but that not all actions are possible. The ‘not all actions’ indicates something irreducible in each technological artefact that lets us say that in specific situations technologies do determine (as long as “determine” is understood as fields of action and not one single action). <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">The obvious and immediate problem is this looks like yoking together two contradictory positions of technology and society determining each other without resolving the contradiction, and I find theories of affordances tends to ignore the question of what ‘irreducible’ means here, even though this is the claim that lots of social studies of technology criticised. I’m tempted to suggest this resolves into different layers; technological determinism is an everyday phenomenon, whereas cultural/social ‘construction’ is a meta- social construction. The problem here is that if you go back to the examples I gave, the redetermination of technologies for social/cultural interests is not done at a collective/meta-social level but at the micro. || The affordance of a mode is shaped by its materiality, by what it has been repeatedly used to mean and do (its ‘provenance’), and by the social norms and conventions that inform its use in context – and this may shift, as well as through timescales and spatial trajectories (Lemke, 2000; Massey, 2005). Each mode – as it has been shaped and is socially contextualized – possesses certain ‘logics’. || Bakhtin’s theory of social language as a basis for researching net work environments. “//Learning a social language means joining, sharing, and coconstructing the**logos** constituted by it; it means joining a community and learning (if not necessarily accepting) that community’s ideology or ideologies. And, as Bakhtin says, it also means differentiating oneself from others who have not learned the social language.”// (Spinuzzi, 27) ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;">The claim I’m making here is more than theoretical flag waving; it’s a critical realization that the relationship I have with my course’s web space is a choice. I am not choosing a channel nor utility, like selecting a cell phone service provider, but rather I am declaring my pedagogical relationship to knowledge. When I began teaching college writing, I treated the CMS as a mere utility or information channel. To set the scene: it’s 2004. The Blackboard precursor WebCT (web course tool) is en vogue. I jump right in, awkwardly manipulating and customizing navigation options, swooning over WebCT’s cumbersome easiness, and feeling proud of my adventuresome spirit all the while. I am seriously amazed at the convenience of having an online space to assist me with administrative duties of teaching. But gradually I begin to realize through my own observations, but also through becoming attuned to a surge of discussion on Twitter and academic blogs around 2008, that my course site is not just a supplement to “real” classroom activities. I begin to intuit McLuhan’s dictum that “The use of any kind of medium or extension of man alters the patterns of interdependence among people, as it alters the ratios among our senses” (McLuhan 90). Both WordPress and the university CMS are tools that foreshadow and forestall possibilities for writing online, whether we are conscious of it or not. And in this way, both WP and the university CMS are much more than tools. ||  ||
 * Language as a mediating affordance || Mediation as self transformation see note son Spunuzzi
 * CMS and Wordpress || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;"> “no CMS is perfect.” Both WordPress and the university CMS are two breeds of the same species: technology that both creates and contains possibilities. In this way, then, they are comparable to any learning technology that has come before. They both mediate knowledge and shape the process through which individuals collect and construct and co-construct knowledge.
 * Cognition moratorium and Latour and ladders || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">Latour famously proposed in //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #8c4600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px; text-decoration: none;">[|Science in Action] //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;"> that we institute a ten-year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science and technology. (Hakkarainen criticized this moratorium in a 2003 //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">Science and Education //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;"> issue, complaining that Latour mentions this moratorium every so often, always extending it for ten years.) This moratorium came out of Latour's observations of scientific work, in which he noticed that scientists would assemble a large array of nonhumans and humans—instruments, procedures, lab techs, etc.—to perform science, then attribute the results to //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">cognition //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">. Without all of these nonhuman and human intermediaries, Latour argued, cognition //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">could not have provided an adequate explanation //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">Let's use an analogy. Suppose that as you walk home, you spot your neighbor on the roof. Do you think to yourself, "I am amazed that my neighbor can jump so high!" Or do you look for a ladder? Analogically speaking, Latour always looks for the ladder. He sees the alternate explanation—based entirely on human ability—as rather implausible. Yes, it's always a possibility, but (Latour might say) let's look for the ladder first. ||  || http://culturedigitally.org/2012/01/affordances-technical-agency-and-the-politics-of-technologies-of-cultural-production-2/ || <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">One alternative framework is actor-network kinds of approaches, in which nothing is irreducible and everything can be followed as an actor. One expression of this (along side Law’s “mess,” or Haraway’s use of “becoming-with”) is Latour’s idea of the “factish.” I’ll crudely summarise this as the collective practice that emerges when the question ‘is it real or is it constructed?’ is refused. All the various actants or actors in the making of a world are mingled together, meaning that human and non-human must all be seen together in their various actions and connections. It is in this inter-mingled sense of collective creation that the factish emerges and entirely reorders what we might have thought was meant by what is real or independent. The factish refuses the opposition between being the thing that “really acts” or is “just part of a construction.” In response to these oppositions that the factish refuses, Latour argues: “The factish suggests an entirely different move: it is because it is constructed that it is so very real, so autonomous, so independent of our own hands. As we have seen over and over, attachments do not decrease autonomy, but foster it. Until we understand that the terms “construction” and “autonomous reality” are synonyms, we will misconstrue the factish as yet another form of social constructivism rather than seeing it as the modification of the entire theory of what it means to construct.” (Latour, 275) ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #444444; display: block; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 23.4px; margin: 0px 0px 0.5em; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;">// Matters of concern //, however, are of an entirely different order: 1/ “they have no clear boundaries, no well-defined essences, no sharp separation between own hard kernel and their environment…. they take on the aspects of tangled beings, forming rhizomes and networks”; 2/ there producers are visible, “they appear in broad daylight, embarrassed, controversial, complicated, implicated, with all their instruments, laboratories, workshops and factories”; 3/ “these quasi objects have no impact, properly speaking,” having instead “numerous connections, tentacles, and pseudopods”; 4/ they are expected to produce unexpected consequences “that properly belong to them, for which they accept responsibility, from which they draw lessons, according to a quite a visible process of apprenticeship” (Latour 24). ||  || page 79 || For me, theory is like the plug-ins we have on computers or the internet. If you don’t have the right plug-in, you just don’t see things on the screen. If you download the plug-in, you see things and you can run the little gimmick that people have put into their web page. Theory for me is like that. A concept has to make a difference. If you download thisvery specific plug-in of the human and non-human connection, you can see things and do things on the screen or in research that you couldn’t see or you couldn’t animate before. It’s not a moral point. I’m not advocating horrible things like mixing humans and non-humans. It’s not like zoophilia or that sort of thing. History of the Human Sciences 2003 16: 77 Colin Barron
 * Irreductions and factish
 * Matters of fact and matters of concern || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #444444; display: block; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 23.4px; margin: 0px 0px 0.5em; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;">For Latour, // matters of fact // have four essential characteristics: 1/ they have “// clear boundaries //, a well-defined essence,” 2/ “the researchers, engineers, entrepreneurs, and technicians who conceived and produced these objects and brought them to market become // invisible //“; 3/ the “‘risk-free object’ brought with it … consequences … always conceived in the form of an impact on a // different // universe, composed of entities less easy to delimit, and which were designated by vague names such as ‘ social factors,’ ‘political dimensions,’ or ‘irrational aspects”; 4/ when these objects did produce unexpected consequences, sometimes “catastrophic,” these were seen to come from outside and “// never had an impact on //the initial definition of the object, with its boundaries and its essence” (22-23).
 * Latour plugins as theory A Strong Distinction between Humans and Non-Humans is no Longer

A Strong Distinction between Humans and Non-Humans is no Longer Required for Research Purposes: A Debate Between Bruno Latour and Steve Fuller ||  || philosophy since Kant have been without a world. Things do nothing. What you learn at the beginning of sociology 101, especially if it’s continental theory 101, Bourdieu or Frankfurt 101, is precisely that things do not act. Are we so naïve as to think that things act? No, we know very well that it’s the projection of our own society and value onto things which do nothing. This is what we teach. What is taught in many departments, which is one of the interesting origins of the science wars, is that things do not count. Subjectivity counts, language counts, social structures count, and things are there as mere support for a society and language to be moulded or to be carved. The words vary, but the argument is always the same. It’s always Kant and the critical position. Things do not count. It’s the same old Copernican revolution, which is a very odd term to describe the social sciences. page 80 History of the Human Sciences 2003 16: 77 Colin Barron
 * Latour and things do nothin' || It’s a very simple point: most of the social sciences and most of

A Strong Distinction between Humans and Non-Humans is no Longer Required for Research Purposes: A Debate Between Bruno Latour and Steve Fuller ||  || > all knowledge rests upon injustice, that there is no right, not even in the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth, and that the instinct for knowledge is malicious (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind). ||  || <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">Affordance theory remains, at least to me, an obvious fit for this kind of analysis because it allows the flexibility of seeing where agency is both constrained and enabled by technologies and that non-technological agencies can form technologies. However, it does so by fusing two kinds of causation together rather than theorising them. As bluntly as I think I can put it, affordance theory is based on a contradiction that it assumes rather than confronting. <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">I think the problem comes from presuming what it is that needs explaining. The presumption is made that there is some kind of distinction between matter and discourse, and that this idea of matter is outside of social or cultural or discursive constraints. It’s the common sense view that there is ‘something’ that is not social or cultural but is instead matter or physical or real. Gibson says: > An important fact about the affordances of the environment is that they are in a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an affordance is neither an objective property or a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behaviour. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and the observer. (Gibson 1986, 129) <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">Though Gibson tries to say ‘neither/both’ he maintains two kinds of facts and imposes or assumes a dualism; the environment always imposes some kind of reality. Hutchby builds on this: “Does this reference to capabilities not mean that there are, after all, the kinds of determinate properties to technologies which social constructivists argue against? In a way it does. To focus on affordances in the way I suggest is to accept that there are features of artefacts that are not constructed through accounts.” (Hutchby, 29). What is going on here, I’d argue, is a presumption of a matter/discourse divide when that is what needs explaining when we are analysing techno-social inter-relations. <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;"> <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">I think this intuition is held more widely than affordance theory. From an entirely different direction, Karen Barad is another example of making this presumption, almost because it is common sense. “It is difficult to imagine how psychic and socio-historical forces alone would account for the production of matter. Surely it is the case-even when the focus is restricted to the materiality of “human” bodies (and how can we stop there?)-that there are “natural,” not merely “social,” forces that matter.” (Barad, 66) She seems to base her view on the fact that there must be something out there as matter that is beyond our discourse, but this assumption implements the distinction she is investigating http://culturedigitally.org/2012/01/affordances-technical-agency-and-the-politics-of-technologies-of-cultural-production-2/ ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">Affective responses to material objects are integral to their biographical meaning to their owners and their participation in intimate relationships. Writers on material culture and affect have noted the entangling of bodies/selves with physical objects and how artefacts act as extensions or prostheses of the body/self, becoming markers of personhood. Objects become invested with sentimental value by virtue of their association with specific people and places, and thus move from anonymous, mass-produced items to biographically-inscribed artefacts that bear with them personal meanings. Over use and with time, such initially anonymised objects become personalised prosthetics of the self, their purely functional status and monetary value replaced by more personal and sentimental value ( [|Miller 2008], [|Turkle 2007] ). ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">The cultural and political analysis of computer software is sometimes referred to as software studies. Writers in software studies place an emphasis not on the transmission or reception of messages, as in the old model of communication, but rather have developed a sociomaterial interest in the ways in which acts of computation produce and shape knowledges. Computer coding are positioned as agents in configurations and assemblages (Fuller, 2008), producing what Kitchin and Dodge (2011) refer to as ‘coded assemblages’. Indeed the pervasive nature of software in everyday life is such that Manovich (2013: no page number given) argues that it has become ‘a universal language, the interface to our imagination and the world’. He contends, therefore, that social researchers should be conceptualising people’s interactions with digital technologies as ‘software performances’ which are constructed and reconstructed in real-time, with the software constantly reacting to the user’s actions || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">these forms of information, like any other type, are socially created and have a social life, a vitality, of their own. Digital data objects structure our concepts of identity, embodiment, relationships, our choices and preferences and even our access to services or spaces. <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">There are many material aspects to digital data. They are the product of complex decisions, creative ideas, the solving and management of technical problems and marketing efforts on the part of those workers who are involved in producing the materials that create, manage and store these data. They are also the product of the labour of the prosumers who create the data. These are the ‘invisible’ material aspects of digital data (Aslinger and Huntemann, 2013). <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">Algorithms play an important role in configuring digital data objects. Algorithms measure and sort the users of digital technologies, deciding what choices they may be offered. Digital data objects aggregated together, often from a variety of sources, configure ‘metric assemblages’ (Burrows, 2012) or ‘surveillant assemblages’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) that produce a virtual// doppelganger // of the user. Algorithms and other elements of software, therefore, are generative, a productive form of power (Mackenzie, 2005; Beer, 2009; Cheney-Lippold, 2011; Mackenzie and Vurdubakis, 2011; boyd and Crawford, 2012; Beer, 2013; Ruppert et al., 2013). || Pedagogy centres around, and is constantly mediated by, material things. Pedagogical encounters change radically when its things change, for example, when a PowerPoint presentation is used instead of a textbook, or field trip to show how a pumping station works, or when desks and chairs are removed for learning activities to explore democracy or relationships. (p. 5) ||  || Ananayse Local area network traffic all the packets addressed to and sent by your computer Walter benjeming Circulates reproductions without our authorisation or knowledge - control contra rule literalisation of control is not an added feature central feature automation of decision that is essential for the internet simultaneously hidden and amplified - the user access all the traffic that goes through the netwrk and then actively deleting the things that are not addressed to it personal network computer is an oxy moron democractises and ||  || http://www.garyhall.info/journal/2014/3/4/zombie-materialism-iv-performative-materiality-and-media-arc.html || ethnographic, phenomenological, poststructuralist approaches. It is more and more replaced by dynamic concepts which also take phenomena of difference, hybridity, dissemination and intermingling into account. In new concepts on performativity or on practices etc. the multiplicity of topoi, centers and backing interestscome into sight, signifying and constituting reality.(Oswald 1997: 62)In the consequence,the diversity,complexity and ambiguity of symbolic ordersbecome thinkable and can be examined. One can realize that“practices systematically form subjects and objects” (Foucault 1972: 49). ||
 * Knowledge power foucault || Foucault’s gaze shifted to systems of power. In a Nietzschean spirit, he coined the term //[|power-knowledge]// to indicate the involvement of knowledge in the maintenance of power relations. As he argued in the essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1977), an examination of the notion of truth reveals that
 * Two seeminmgly conflicting perspectives:: actors are networks and networks are an effect of relations between actors || <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt;">actor-network theory suggests two important and seemingly conflicting perspectives. The first perspective is that all actors are also networks in and of themselves. They are not simply a person or body but also a body-network – a pattern of heterogeneous relations, or an effect produced by such relations. The meaning of actor-network is that an actor is always a network defined by the order of materials and the patterning of relationships. ||  ||
 * Translation as a struggle for dominance || <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt;">As Law (1992, p. 4) puts it, “The actor-network theory assumes that social structure in not a noun but a verb. Structure is not free standing, like scaffolding on a building-site, but a site of struggle, a relational effect that recursively generates and reproduces itself . . . It is the result of a struggle with like networks in which one pattern overcomes another through a process of “heterogeneous engineering” in which bits and pieces from the social, the technical, the conceptual and the textual are fitted together, and so converted (or ‘translated’) into a set of equally heterogeneous (scientific) projects.” ||  ||
 * Key pressing and mouse manipulation as non affordance || <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15.1999998092651px;">entions as keybinding, mouseturning, etc. I was reminded of the latter as a good friend of mine has recently taken up playing a tank for the first time in an MMOG (Rift, though it’s more or less the same as World of Warcraft for this example) after years of playing a caster. He’s always been proud of key-turning (for non-gamers that is turning by pressing keys rather than the classic position of one hand pressing buttons and the other on the mouse, using the mouse to turn the avatar) but now I find he’s not as good as I’d expect, as he can’t react quickly enough (in my opinion; he blames me). A certain requirement for efficiency and speed that a covert mechanic or a technical agency creates is met by a cultural arrangement of technical agencies in the mouse, keyboard and fingers.
 * Lists as blogs or Twitter feeds || <span style="color: #111111; display: block; font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14.6667px; text-align: justify;">The communicativecontentof social media spaces is also frequently rendered in the form of lists. Famously, blogs are defined in the first place by their reverse-chronological listing of posts (Walker Rettberg), but the same is true for current social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms are inherently centred around an infinite, constantly updated and extended list of posts made by individual users and their connections ||  ||
 * Affective response http://simplysociology.wordpress.com/ || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;"> The design of digital devices and software interfaces is highly important to users’ responses to them. Devices such as iPhones are often described in highly affective and aestheticised terms: as beautiful playthings, glossy and shiny objects of desire, even as edible or delicious. Advertising for the iPhone and other Apple devices often focus on inspiring child-like wonder at their beauty and magical capabilities ( [|Cannon and Barker 2012] ).
 * Habitus || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Freund (2004, p. 273) uses the term ‘technological habitus’ to describe the ‘internalised control’ and kinds of consciousness required of individuals to function in technological environments such as those currently offered in contemporary western societies. The human/machine entity, he argues, is not seamless: rather there are disjunctions – or, as he puts it, ‘seams in the cyborg’ – where fleshly body and machine do not intermesh smoothly, and discomfort, stress or disempowerment may result. Sleep patterns, increasing work and commuting time and a decrease in leisure time, for example, can be disrupted by the use of technologies, causing illness, stress and fatigue. Our bodies may begin to alert us that these objects are material in the ways that they affect our embodiment: through eye-strain, hand, neck or back pain or headaches from using the devices too much (Lupton, 1995). ||  ||
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">assemblages || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: 'Droid Sans','Trebuchet MS',Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">digital data objects that are brought together through digital technologies, including ‘like’ or ‘share’ buttons, individuals’ browser histories, personalised recommendations and comments on social media posts as well as the hardware and software that structure the choices available to users, are assemblages of complex interactions of economic, technological, social and cultural logics (Mackenzie, 2005; Mackenzie and Vurdubakis, 2011; Caplan, 2013; Langois and Elmer, 2013). Representing digital phenomena as objects serves the purpose of acknowledging their existence, effects and power (Marres, 2012; Caplan, 2013; Hands, 2013; Langois and Elmer, 2013).
 * tHINGS CHANGE PEDAGOGY || Fenwick and Richards (2010) put it:
 * Packet sniffer || Promiscious mode the Wendy Chung
 * Materiality || materiality refers to the fact that modes are taken to be the product of the work of social agents shaping material, physical ‘stuff’ into meaningful stuff, that is, into cultural / semiotic resources. This materiality has important semiotic potentials in itself: sound has different affordances to ‘graphic’ inscription; gesture offers different potentials to colour; and so on. ||  ||
 * computational thinking || http://codeactsineducation.wordpress.com/papers-presentations-writing/ || What are the Digital Posthumanities
 * ==Performativity, Materiality and Time in Pedagogy== || tradition to look at space, time, person, action as if they were unities (cp. Bollig 2012). Internal conditions, such as abilities, motivation, subjective perceptions etc., are then regarded as distinct entities and as clearly separated from the external conditions of education, such as social conditions, time and space structures etc. || http://tacitdimensions.wordpress.com/events/performativity-materiality-and-time-in-pedagogy/
 * Practice http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4153/1/WRAP_Nicolini_manuscript_rtp10_--__final__with_corrections.pdf || As authors such as Heidegger (1947) and Wittgenstein (1953) made clear, practice constitutes the unspoken and scarcely notable background of everyday life. Practices therefore always need to be drawn to the fore, made visible and turned into an epistemic object in order to enter discourse....

Four approaches in particular constitute the main tributaries of my framework and need to be briefly mentioned here. First, I draw on the Wittgenstenian and Heideggerian view of social affairs and their emphasis on the centrality of social practices and practical understanding as the foundational texture of everyday life (Schatzki, 1996; 2002; Shotter, 1993; Chia and Holt, 2006). These two traditions take practices as primitive and argue that mutual understandings, systems of beliefs and rules build upon on them and rely on their existence. It follows that the meaningful, purposive and consistent nature of human conduct descends from participating in social practices and not from the deployment of rules, goals and beliefs. The Wittgenstenian and Heideggerian traditions therefore allow us to decentre such phenomena as mind, meaning and intentionality, so locating the roots of social co-existence in the practices that all people qua humans are necessarily involved (Schatzki, 1996; 2002; Chia and Holt, 2006).. ||  || Schatzki, 2002; 2005).
 * Practice based ontology || ....outlining a coherent practice-based ontology (Llewellyn, 2008). Once we have accepted that the world is the result of an incessant process of social construction, we have only begun our task. Claiming that social structures, inequalities, power and meaning are “constructed” requires that we provide convincing accounts of what this means in practice,...Cultural and Historical Activity Theory (Engeström, 1987; 2000; Blackler, 1993; Miettinen, 2005). A central tenet of this approach is the idea that all social and material practices emerge around an object or prospective outcome that “motivates and directs activities, around which activities are coordinated, and in which activities are crystallized (…) when the activities are complete" (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006: 66). While many aspects of practice (from the division of labour to the rules and tools to be used and the identity each member will assume) emerge around a specific object of work, such an object is also the result of the interests of the community that gathers around it plus other interests mediated in the activity through a variety of other intermediaries (Miettinen and Virkkunen 2005). ||  ||
 * ANT is not a practice based ontoloty it is more semiotic which I thought was more reperesentation oriented || (ANT: Latour, 2005) and other semiotic-orientated social ontologies (Czarniawska, 2004; Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005, Lindberg and Czarniawska, 2006; Czarniawska, 2007). These approaches draw attention to the constitutive power of associations. They argue that social agency (both individual and collective) is constituted through assembling, aligning and stabilising patterns of relationships so that any form of social order is in fact the outcome of observable instances of ordering. From this follows that the main task of social science is tracing the associations between human and non-human elements and studying the effects that the resulting arrangements make in the world. By emphasising that any form of social order, no matter how seemingly ‘macro’ and durable, is the result of the active connection between local instances of ordering, semioticoriented social ontologies offer both a language and a method for studying organisational and institutional phenomena without having to revert to the idea of pre-existing levels of reality. Although they are not strictly speaking theories of practice, ANT and the sociology of translation offer a powerful theory/method package for outlining a thorough practice-based ontology of organisational phenomena. ||  ||
 * Practice is materially mediated and in the CHAT thing obly subject to human intention and agency || − Practices constitute the horizon within which all discursive and material actions are made possible and acquire meaning; that practices are inherently contingent, materially mediated, and that practice cannot be understood without reference to a specific place, time, and concrete historical context (Engeström, 2000; Latour, 2005;

− While practices depend on reflexive human carriers to be accomplished and perpetuated, human agential capability always results from taking part in one or more socio-material practices (Reckwitz, 2002). ||  ||
 * Modes Latour double click || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">Throughout his career, Latour has studied how meaning and knowledge are produced in the sciences, in technology, in law, in religion, in economics, and in politics. Here, he argues that these represent separate processes for developing meaning, processes that are internally consistent but that appear at odds when they come into contact. Those processes are all ways for making meanings and truth—ways with different logics, aims, and standards of proof. But it's difficult to get these modes of existence to interact well for two reasons.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">First, it's easy to make category mistakes, mixing up their separate felicity conditions.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">Second, and related, it's easy to assume that the different modes of existence are essentially compatible, boiling down to the same mode of existence and ideally following the same logics, aims, and standards of proof (something that Latour describes using the figure of "double click"). For instance, when someone tries to apply the felicity conditions of science to politics, or those of technology to religion, s/he is invoking the "double click," assuming that there can be transportation without transformation. ||  ||
 * Public polic* labs || labs operate as cross-sectoral e"iators who translate  i"eas an" processes fro the "oain of "atabase-"riv en coputing into e"ucational  polic* proposals.https://www.academia.edu/5898307/New_governing_experts_in_education_Policy_labs_self-learning_software_and_transactional_pedagogies ||   ||
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">modes of existence || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">the modes of existence in the back of the book:

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; display: block; font-family: Georgia,serif;">Each has its own hiatus (loosely speaking, a disruptive condition), trajectory (i.e., results of transformations), felicity/infelicity conditions (when they thrive vs. when they crash), beings to institute (i.e., objectives to produce), and alteration (i.e., the way in which they are transformed). ||  ||
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">reproduction
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">metamorphosis
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">habit
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">technology
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">fiction
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">reference
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">politics
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">law
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">religion
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">attachment
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">organization
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">morality
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">network
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">preposition
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">double-click
 * http://amodern.net/article/amoderns-impossible-project/ || [|[2]] This anthropological project, with strong roots in pragmatist philosophy, is a thorough undoing of the modern divide of the subject and object, showing the ways in which this reduction obscures our relations with each other and the world, even within and for our own espoused values. And it is only by taking stock of our values that we can begin to compose the kinds of politics that will be necessary to move from modernization to ecologization. ||  ||
 * modes as fields of activity as well as general pracices eg habit not associated with only one field or not a field at all || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">some of these modes are tied to fields (e.g., politics, law, religion) while others are not (e.g., habit, organization, network). Activity theorists will note that habit, which AT would associate with the operational level of activity, is presented as a separate mode. Yes, these modes are entangled in practice, and I'm not always clear on why a field-oriented mode (e.g., science) is on the same footing as a mode that is inevitably going to be instantiated in every other mode (e.g., habit). But Latour is not simply attempting to examine these modes as separate, but as inevitably crossing and producing hybrids. For instance, he talks about the crossings between networks and prepositions (p.63), reproduction and reference (p.106), reference and politics (p.128), reproduction and metamorphosis (p.202), technology and networks (p.212), and so forth. In defining each mode along basic canonical questions (hiatus, trajectory, felicity/infelicity, beings to institute, alteration), Latour has presented a way to systematically investigate each mode and how each mode interacts with the others. ||  ||
 * Analytic philosophy || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #000000; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 16px; text-align: start;">Analytic philosophy is also a discipline: to pursue mastery at "the articulate expression of philosophical comprehension as connected courses of reasoning". Such mastery incidentally bears the marks of care and authority prized and recognized in one's time. For instance, it bears traces of symbolic logic or quantified modal logic, now, and tries to look "scientific"; just as typically, in the 1300's such mastery was marked by the explicit syllogistic forms and the meta-language modal arguments of Duns Scotus, and logical subject-matter of Ockham.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #000000; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 16px; text-align: start;">f you think of analytic philosophy as disciplined argumentation, but with distinctive doctrinal commitments [to: positivism, logical atomism, ideal languages, verificationism, physicalistic reductionism, materialism, functionalism, connectivism, computational accounts of perception, and inductive accounts of language learning], then THAT analytic philosophy is fast going the way of acid rock and the plastic LP. Not because the method has betrayed the doctrines. Rather, the doctrines disintegrate under the method. ||  || Andreas Diedrich & Fredrik Lavén Frozen fish and mummies: On the role of preserved objects in organizing 7 || ====Czarniawska (2005), that there are only very few goals to pursue with the introduction of new technology in organizations: you either wish to become more productive, more efficient or more democratic in one way or another. As a result, according to her, people **are deceived time and time again by the shiny, new models and technologies**. Labelling organizing as success or failure has many dimensions that can only be addressed by considering the context within which the work is embedded and exploring the role of contingencies and constantly uncertain outcomes. One way to do so is to study organizing as the construction of actor networks (Law, 1992; Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005, Czarniawska, 2008). Actor network theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986; 1987) **describes the strategies, actions, tricks, etc. with which persons or collective actors undertake translations** in order to consolidate the network that supports them and make it as stable as possible.==== ||  ||
 * Things as shiny better improvementsas innovations - ENROLement Nthing succeeds like failure Latour
 * four moments

of translation – problematization, interessement, enrolment, and mobilization || ANT traces the development of macro actors as a process of translation. In his seminal article on scallops, Michel Callon (1986) identifies four moments of translation – problematization, interessement, enrolment, and mobilization. Through problematization, the initiating actor defines the identities and interests of the other actors to become involved. Secondly, interessement entails attempts by an actor to convince the other actors that the interests it has defined for them are in line with their own interests. Third, through enrolment, the roles defined for actors are related to each other and actors are encouraged to adopt them. Finally, through mobilization, the initiating actor ensures that allied spokespersons act according to the agreement and refrain from betraying their interests. In this process, the actors’ identities and interests are under constant negotiation and transformation (Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 1986), yet these identities may become stabilized in relation to each other. ||  || TAM || <span style="display: block; font-family: serif; font-size: 13.28px; left: 94.592px; top: 965.253px; transform-origin: 0% 0% 0px; transform: scale(0.998767,1);">At an individual level, the technology acceptance model (TAM) of Davis <span style="display: block; font-family: serif; font-size: 13.28px; left: 491.453px; top: 965.253px; transform-origin: 0% 0% 0px; transform: scale(1.01362,1);">(1989) is widely used in IS research to <span style="display: block; font-family: serif; font-size: 13.28px; left: 94.592px; top: 980.448px; transform-origin: 0% 0% 0px; transform: scale(0.982558,1);">investigate user acceptance and adoption. TAM has four constructs, namely, perceived usefulness, perceived <span style="display: block; font-family: serif; font-size: 13.28px; left: 94.592px; top: 995.808px; transform-origin: 0% 0% 0px; transform: scale(1.01097,1);">ease of use, behavioral intention to use and actual system use. Accordingly, it has been modified and extended a number of times (e.g. TAM2 (Venkatesh and Davis 2000), TAM3 (Venkatesh and Bala 2008), http://mo.bf.rmit.edu.au/acis2013/88.pdf ||  || http://evergreen.edu/catalog/2014-15/programs/makingmeaningmattertheornamentofmateriality-12184 ||   ||
 * Andreas Diedrich & Fredrik Lavén Frozen fish and mummies: On the role of preserved objects in organizing 7 || of developing and spreading the SS 62 40 70 standard as efforts to produce a ‘management technology’, an object that mediates between a complex reality and management. When the object fails to become a management technology, new objects are constructed and are to be placed between the intended mediator (now the complex reality) and management. We argue that such an artefact-centred approach (Pentland and Feldman, 2008), while common in contemporary management, does not translate well into intended actions. ||  ||
 * technology acceptance model
 * || https://sites.evergreen.edu/making/
 * immateriality of media and new materialism || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">In the context of digital media culture, the notion of “materiality” occupies a curious position in itself. As observed by Bill Brown in his entry for the recent Critical Terms for Media Studies (Chicago UP, 2010), our understanding of the media historical modernity has been infiltrated early on with the idea of “**abstraction” — abstraction as a driving force (as with standardization of techniques, processes, and messaging) and an effect (represented in forms of power, subjectivities, cultural practices) of modernity.** Recognized by a range of different writers from **Karl Marx to Debord and Baudrillard,** such a process has been influential in forcing us to rethink **not materiality but dematerialisation as crucial to understanding the birth of technical media culture.** Regimes of value, and regimes of technical media share the same impact on “things” – homogenisation, standardisation, and ease of communication/commodification in a joint tune with each other are in this perspective, and a perspective that branded critical theory for a long time, crucial aspects in any analysis of media culture’s relation to materiality.

http://jussiparikka.net/2010/06/23/what-is-new-materialism-opening-words-from-the-event/ || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">not materiality but dematerialisation as crucial to understanding the birth of technical media culture. ||
 * the medium and capitalist culture and media || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">Hence, the move from the critical evaluation of emergence of capitalist media culture seemed to flow surprisingly seamlessly as part of the more technology-oriented discourse concerning “immateriality” of the digital in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, in a new context, materiality was deemed as an obsolescent index of media development overcome by effective modes of coding, manipulating and transferring information across networks that become par excellence the object of desire of policies as much cultural discourses.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">understand the notion of “medium” in this context. Instead of being only something that in a Kantian manner prevents access to the world of the real or material, or things (Brown, p.51) the medium itself becomes a material assemblage in the hands of a wave of German media theorists, who have develop a unique approach to media materialism, and hence new materialist notions of the world. Here the world is not reduced to symbolic, signifying structures, or representations, but is seen for such writers as Friedrich Kittler (and more recent theorists such as Wolfgang Ernst in a bit differing tone under media archaeology) as a network of concrete, material, physical and physiological apparatuses and their interconnections, that in a Foucauldian manner govern whatever can be uttered and signified. http://jussiparikka.net/2010/06/23/what-is-new-materialism-opening-words-from-the-event/ || This brand of German media theory came out as an alternative exactly to the Marxist as well as hermeneutic contexts of theory dominating German discussions in the 1960s-1980s, and carved out a specific interest to the coupling of the human sensorium with the non-human worlds of modern technical media. In this insight, and ones shared by writers such as Jonathan Crary || Onto-Cartography An Ontology of Machines and Media ||  || http://philosophyinatimeoferror.com/2010/04/28/larval-subject-to-an-interview-levi-bryant/ ||  ||   ||   ||   ||   || //A// representational //account of the internet would tend to reduce it to its status as a// tool //or implement for human practices and intention. Here the nonhuman actor—in this case the internet –becomes invisible or erased behind the human intention. The implement itself, one would say, is largely irrelevant as the tool is thoroughly explained in terms of the structure of human intentionality. Here we might think of Heidegger’s analysis of tools, where strangely tools in their being as objects don’t appear at all. Rather, we get an analysis of the “for-the-sake-of-which”, the “in-order-to”, the “in-which”, etc. The tool is merely a vehicle or carrier for these human intentions.//
 * what is material || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">modern technical media showed such wavelengths, speeds, vibrations and other physical characteristics in itself that it escaped any phenomenological analysis, and hence tapped into a material world unknown per se to humans. || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">new interests in material constellations of “platforms, interfaces, data standards, file formats, operating systems, versions and distributions of code, patches, ports and so forth”, to paraphrase Matthew Kirschenbaum. Naturally, post-representational approaches are present in a wide range of work and other thinkers, from the Deleuze-inspired cinematic philosophies of Steven Shaviro to sociological ideas of Nigel Thrift, the new materialist mappings of subhuman bodies such as blobs by Luciana Parisi to the politically tuned analyses of network culture of Tiziana Terranova — and the range of theories and theorists we are able to enjoy today. ||
 * Materialism instead of staying as matter turns in critical study into discursive practice
 * Edition: 1 ||
 * Author: [|Levi R. Bryant] ||  || Among Continental critical and socialand political theorists, we are again and again told that they’repositions are “materialist,” only to see the materiality of matter upand disappear in their analyses. In these discourses and theoretical orientations, the term “materialism” has become so watered downthat it’s come to denote little more than “history” and “practice.”It is certainly true that matter evolves and develops and thereforehas a history, and practices such as building houses engage withmatter. Unfortunately, under the contemporary materialism, fol-lowing from a highly selective reading of Marx, “history” has largely come to mean discursivehistory, and practice has come to mean discursive practices. ||   ||
 * Subject object || Since Descartes, philosophy has tended to obsess on a single relation or gap between humans and objects, focusing almost exclusively on how subjects or humans represent objects. In many instances, this tradition //reduces// objects to their representations //by// humans, treating objects as mere passive vehicles that carry these representations without contributing any differences of their own.
 * Subject object || Since Descartes, philosophy has tended to obsess on a single relation or gap between humans and objects, focusing almost exclusively on how subjects or humans represent objects. In many instances, this tradition //reduces// objects to their representations //by// humans, treating objects as mere passive vehicles that carry these representations without contributing any differences of their own.
 * the role of the internet as a mediumhttp://philosophyinatimeoferror.com/2010/04/28/larval-subject-to-an-interview-levi-bryant/// || the key point would be that there is no such thing as a neutral//medium. Rather, whenever agents interact through a medium, whether that medium be speech, writing, smoke signals, comics, video, music, clay, text messaging, the internet, etc., the medium both// affords //possibilities of interaction that would not be possible in any other medium, and// constrains //possibilities. In terms of McLuhan’s tetrad, we should always ask “what does the medium enhance or intensify?”// and //“what does it render obsolete or displace?”//

//what differences// objects //contribute, over and above the human intentions thrown over them like a spider’s web. Like any object or set of objects, the internet constrains and affords possibilities of interaction among humans in unique ways. In// Understanding Media//, McLuhan writes that we should seek to understand how “…the medium… shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action” (9). Additionally, we should seek to understand how the medium in-forms// content//. As for the scale and pace of human associations, and with respect to philosophy in particular, the blogosphere has tended towards overturning the hegemony of the academy or the university system. Traditionally philosophy has taken place in expensive and hard to obtain academic journals, difficult to find philosophy texts, and professional conferences that can be very expensive to attend. And by and large the “price of admission” in any of these venues has been an advanced degree of some sort. Further, in many cases articles in journals are seldom read, but you also get group networks of like-minded philosophers that begin controlling the content of journals, what articles will be published, what articles will not be published, and whose articles will be published.// ||  ||   ||   ||   ||   || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">1) The seemingly immaterial is embedded in wide material networks; information is informed by the existence of material networks, practices, and various entanglements, that expand both to the materiality of political economy of ownership, access and use, but also to the material assemblages which govern the way we are in media milieus. <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">2) Yet, technical media is also defined by non-object based materialities, which makes it slightly more difficult to conceptualise. As a regime of electromagnetic fields, of pulsations, electricity, and such fields as software, technical media and digital culture escape the language of solids. <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">3) The intimate connection between the dynamic human/animal body and media tech, which since the 19th century and for example experimental psychology labs has now extended to the various design practices in HCI and such that tap into the physiological thresholds of the human being in novel ways – hence the interest in affect, emotion, non-conscious and ||
 * || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">somatic levels of the human body, and emergence of various forms of interfacing, whether from the consumer tech of <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #2970a6; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px; text-decoration: none;">[|Kinect] <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">-gaming body-in-movement-meets-Xbox interface to still very aspirational Brain-2-Brain, B-2-B, networking and such. Its here that the knowledge about the kinetic, dynamic, and relational body feeds into understanding the moving-situatedness of us in mobile network cultures. || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Verdana,'BitStream vera Sans',Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">to summarize the intimate link between the analytical perspectives that go under the general umbrella term New Materialism and media theory and digital culture, it would have to do with at least three directions
 * Material and things and Symmetry || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">Thus, in this relativist sociology, you can't understand the social until you trace the associations among things (p.5). The things themselves aren't social; what's social is how they are shuffled together //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;"> (p.64). //

//<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">Is there a difference between hitting a nail //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">with //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;"> and //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">without //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;"> a hammer? //

//<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">This is one of the provocative questions that Latour asks in //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #8c4600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px; text-decoration: none;">[|Reassembling the Social] //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;"> (p.71). The question, of course, is rhetorical: of course there's a difference. Using the hammer remakes—perhaps I should say //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">makes //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">—the activity in a very fundamental way. Perhaps holding a hammer makes every problem look like a nail, but similarly, a nail poses a very different problem when one doesn't have a hammer.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 13.1428575515747px;">Yet, Latour charges, classical sociology has tended to ignore the hammer and other material objects when it examines human activities. These material objects are often seen as incidental, he says, to what classical sociologists see as their real focus: social constructs, social structures, social contracts, social forces, etc. ||  ||
 * personalisation

http://eprints.qut.edu.au/62708/1/Vivienne-Burgess-ImagingDigitalLives_revised_final.pdf || Papacharissi (2010) argues that such use of online media supersedes the traditional Habermasian notion of public sphere and constitutes a digitally mediated private sphere: …the personalized content provided by online media fits well within this citizen's private sphere of contemplation, evaluation and action, in which the self remains the point of reference. This citizen is alone, but not isolated. On the contrary, within the private sphere, the individual cultivates civic habits that enable him or her to connect with others on the basis of shared social, political, and cultural priorities. (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 137) ||  || http://culturedigitally.org/2012/01/affordances-technical-agency-and-the-politics-of-technologies-of-cultural-production-2/ || <span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0.619608); font-family: Ubuntu; font-size: 15px;">bringing in a notion of agency that does not necessarily include consciousness, that is instead latent or emergent, helps to bridge several of these conundrums that we find ourselves considering. Splitting agency into a world of actants with and without consciousness emphasizes questions of action-who can act, when, how and why. Why not adopt a new language for agency in a digital age? Doing so will let us set aside a debate in Science and Technology Studies that has prevented us from both recognizing the limits to human and user action, and the extent of action within technical systems oftentimes several layers removed from oversight or design. Talking about designs, affordances, and constraints still centrally places that action with some imagined set of users or producers. As Tim and Josh have pointed out, there are times and virtual places when and where we are not fully in control of our machinescapes. It is time that we bring in concepts that let us describe and understand those moments, rather than continue to rely on an idealized view of the agency of users and producers. ||  || http://michaelseangallagher.org/new-media-ontologies-and-the-technological-unconscious/ || <span style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Open Sans',Arial,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">Hayles’ description then is of a vast set of automated communications that are a part of how we live but are often not a part of our day-to-day conscious existence. We are faced, for Hayles, with ‘active and interactive technologies with cognitive potential’ (Hayles in Gane et al., 2007: 351), operating without the need for human agency. Indeed, the notion of a ‘cognisphere’ suggests that human agency is a part of much broader assemblage of interconnected agencies. She continues: <span style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Open Sans',Arial,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">“Most of the communication will be automated between intelligent devices. Humans will intervene only in a tiny fraction of that flow of communication. Most of it will go on unsensed and really unknown by humans. (Hayles in Gane et al., 2007: 350)” ||  || http://michaelseangallagher.org/new-media-ontologies-and-the-technological-unconscious/ || > In Lash’s words, ‘[w]hat was a medium … has become a thing, a product’ (2007c: 18). The shift that Lash is intimating, and which is being picked up on across a variety of contemporary new media work (as is toward information becoming a part of how we live, a part of our being, a part of how we do things, the way we are treated, the things we encounter, our way of life. The result is that information is not only about how we understand the world, it is also active in constructing it. <span style="font-family: 'Open Sans',Arial,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline;">I see this more as a natural progression through complexity and abstraction. Vygotskian artefacts that have buried in them years of complexity, meaning, and culture. This new media constitutes us much in the same way that previous abstractions created from complexity codified our behavior. We can think of language emerging from sounds, alphabets emerging to codify the language (letters are highly abstract/efficient mechanisms for representing the complexity underneath), written texts to codify the letters and language, (programming) code to provide an accessible mechanism for abstracting the complexity of design language. This new media is now taking its place as the abstraction of current record and the complexity beneath its logical, accessible surface is astounding. The next time you view a logo or an icon, imagine the tempest of meaning and construction underneath its surface. ||  || networks of any material entity, human or nonhuman, and agency (capacity to act) of actors constitutes network, rather than mere connections of human and nonhuman actors. Latour claims that in ANT analysis, humans are not treated any differently from nonhumans, because “without the nonhuman, the humans would not last for a minute (2004: 91).” ||  ||
 * No agency
 * Agency
 * Agency for Barad || is an enactment, not something that someone or something has". Intractivity ||  ||
 * Artefact medium mediate representation abstraction
 * Humans and non humans symetry || Callon, Latour, and Law. According to them, the society consists of
 * Input and output machines

http://www.euppublishing.com/userimages/ContentEditor/1394557044520/Bryant%20-%20Onto-Cartography%20-%20Introduction.pdf || Bryant’s conclusion that the world is made up entirely of mate-rial rather than purely signifying or discursive realities amountsto a vision of “units or individual entities existing at a variety ofdifferent levels of scale ... that are themselves composed of otherentities.” This leads him to formulate amachine-oriented ontologythat forms the backbone of the book now before you. Entities aremachines because they “dynamicallyoperateon inputs producingoutputs.” ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Many draw on Merchant’s (2006) definition of blogs as “online journals which are regularly updated, often with fairly brief postings” (quoted in Davies & Merchant, 2007, p. 178). Accounts on behalf of a wide range of educators who use blogging activities in the classroom describe said activities as affording students an opportunity to pair individual reflections on content in and beyond the classroom with prior, personal experiences (see, for instance: Brooks, Nichols, & Priebe, 2004 and Xie & Sharma, 2004). This kind of an approach is also confirmed by what little empirical research exists on the topic of blogging as a literate activity. Specifically, Herring, Scheidt, Bonus and Wright (2004, p. 1) performed a genre analysis of a corpus of randomly selected blogs and found <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Less evidence than expected of blogs as interlinked, interactive, and oriented towards external events; rather, most of the blogs in our corpus are individualistic, even intimate, forms of self-expression, and a surprising number of them contain few or no links. Based on the profile generated by the empirical analysis, we traced the historical antecedents of weblogs back to hand-written diaries. ||  || The blogosphere significantly challenges these institutions by bringing people together that come from both inside and outside the academy, and by enabling the possibility of philosophical movements that emerge outside of the gatekeepers of the journals and conferences. It is unlikely, for example, that SR would have taken the form it has taken had the blogosphere not existed. To be sure, certain books might still have been published, but rather than coagulating into a loose movement it’s likely they would have been aberrant texts soon forgotten. This is because the Continental philosophy journals and conferences are currently dominated by certain forms of philosophy inimical to both the style and content of SR. However, with the internet it became possible to form collectives and discussions outside of the academy that brought the work of very diverse thinkers together under a single banner. This led to the formation of special issues of journals and entire journals devoted to SR, the hosting of conferences, and the founding of presses to publish this work. A number of graduate students, in their turn, became interested in variants of this thought, pestering, I imagine, their professors and dissertation directors to let them work on these issues, thereby forcing establishment academia to pay more attention to this movement rather than dismissing it out of hand. All of this from a nonhuman actor. Does the content of philosophy change when written in a blog format? A blog entry is still a form of //writing// so our initial hunch might be that the medium has no effect on the content. However, one only need try the experiment of writing all sentences in 45 words or less to see what a profound effect media can have on content. We can think of books as very slow moving conversations. One reason people wrote books was that their interlocutors were not immediately available. Here we might think of Leibniz’s //New Essays on the Human Understanding// which was written as a point by point rejoinder to John Locke. Leibniz abandoned the book when Locke died. The point, however, is that the book is a labor of time. The structure of time on the internet, by contrast, is very different. Where a book might be written over the course of years, a blog entry is written in an hour or so and presented to the public warts and all. Where generally responses to a book are very slow to come, responses to a blog entry can be very quick and ongoing. As a consequence, internet philosophizing tends to lead to a very quick evolution of thought where positions change rapidly. Perhaps this calls for a new sort of philosophy, where one doesn’t so much embody a fixed position as engage in a developing tendency of thought not unlike the evolution of a species over time. ||  || sHIRKEY http://www.digitalcultureandeducation.com/uncategorized/1023-mcnely_html_2010/ || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">We live in a time when the sociotechnical infrastructures for enabling participatory educational experiences in broader publics are, as Shirky (2008, p. 54) suggests, “ridiculously easy” to establish and maintain. But bringing together participatory activities that yield generative interactions between and across overlapping publics is much more challenging. ||  || http://www.rachaelsullivan.com/deliriumwaltz/2013/09/14/reasserting-thing-power/ || **<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;">Ease and forgetability are somewhat paradoxically the clearest beacons of complication and obfuscation. **<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;"> Latour is my touchstone for this point, especially when he describes the automatic door-closer as a technology that disappears until it fails to work on a cold February day. That’s when someone must affix a note reminding new arrivals to close the door behind them because the trusty device “is on strike” (Latour, “Missing Masses” 153). As <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #e502e1; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px; text-decoration: none;">Jentery Sayers paraphrases <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;"> the general argument of Latour and other theorists concerned with nonhuman agency and critical media awareness, “with imperceptibility comes the naturalization of ideologies, where only input and output matter.” Imperceptibility, which often qualifies as ease in our use of interfaces, is an enemy of creative practice and pedagogy. Ease conceals opportunities for intervention and resistance. Such opportunities are actually easier to identify when a particular medium has rough edges and takes something //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: Georgia,'Times New Roman',Times,serif; font-size: 14px;">other than //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;"> ease-of-use as itsprimary goal. In this way then, we might think of rough media as actually being more teachable than easy, squeaky clean, well functioning media. **<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #555555; font-family: 'Lucida Sans Unicode',serif; font-size: 14px;">Contours, bugs, and surprises yield a deeper and less hierarchical critical engagement than we might otherwise discover in things that “just work” seamlessly and solve dilemmas. ** ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">We argue that blogging becomes part of a broader public conversation when posts are timely, topical, and of interest beyond the insular academic concerns of a given course. We also observe that many of the most successful blogs are group efforts—blogs such as [|BoingBoing], [|Huffington Post] , [|Mashable] , etc., and we contend that in order to build a significant public audience a consistent stream of quality content is crucial. ||  || http://www.digitalcultureandeducation.com/uncategorized/dce_1058_wohlwend/ <span style="color: #ff6000; display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Twinkle, twitter little stars: Tensions and flows in interpreting social constructions of the techno-toddler <span style="color: #a1a1a1; display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">September 15, 2012 0 Comments  <span style="color: #323232; display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333px;">**Karen E. Wohlwen & Lara J. Handsfield** || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Deleuze and Guattari (1987) identified six interconnecting principles of the rhizome, which are helpful for considering how rhizomatics might inform understandings of social practices. These principles include connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, asignifying rupture, decalcomania (tracing) and cartography (mapping). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be” (1987, p. 7), such that possible trajectories for practices are heterogeneous rather than dichotomous and linear, and productive of difference rather than only reproducing expected trajectories of practice. This production of difference implies multiplicity, which may be produced through the fourth principle of the rhizome, asignifying rupture, or the divergence via lines of flight from and into familiar and dominant categories or frames. To be clear, lines of flight do not necessarily produce a permanent destruction or negation of dominant social structures or trajectories: “You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject…” (pp. 9-10) and reproduce hierarchies. These restratifying practices can be thought of as “lines of segmentarity” (p. 9). This is an important principle for considering digital geographies of practice. Rhizomes can converge to reproduce hierarchies and dominant power structures. <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Importantly, however, the rhizome is persistently mobile and thus resistant to containment, continually diverging on new lines of flight. In conceptualising approaches to research and interpretation, rhizomatics potentially ruptures the material and interpretive frames, including the establishment and maintenance of a priori and fixed analytic codes. This last point relates to the principles of decalcomania and cartography. Decalcomania, or tracing, implies repetition (Deleuze, 1994), imposing and reproducing redundancies (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), whereas cartography, or mapping, is “oriented to experimentation” (Kamberelis, 2004, p. 165) and productive ofdifference. In everyday practice, lines are traced and mapped, producing multiple flows of both convergence and divergence. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, it is not a question of one category over another, but rather, “of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again” (1987, p. 20). <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">The principles of decalcomania and cartography are particularly important for considering research interpretations, particularly in the case of online, networked literacy practices, which defy bounded notions of space and time. An interpretive approach grounded in rhizomatics, will engage both reproduction, or tracings, and “following,” or mapping out mobile flows: <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">[F]ollwing is not at all the same thing as reproducing, and one never follows in order to reproduce. The ideal of reproduction, deduction, or induction is part of royal science, at all times and in all places, and treats differences of time and place as so many variables…. Reproducing implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the bank. But following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just different. One is obliged to follow when one is in search of the “singularities” of a matter, or rather of a material, and not out to discover a form…. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 372). ||  || http://tapoc.sourceforge.net/progress/2012/06/notes_for_berry-philosophy_of_software.html || The built environment of late capitalist information society is supported by software and mostly happens by software for the sake of software even when serving human ends at the ends of its causal chains; materiality of code on account of its being in and affecting the physical world, spun like webs, largely database to database information. ||
 * Blogging as practice but not linkedhttp://www.digitalcultureandeducation.com/uncategorized/1023-mcnely_html_2010/// || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Davies and Merchant (2007, p. 167) argue that “the production and consumption of blogs is seen as a new form of social practice…a practice which reconfigures relationships and can engender new ways of looking at the world”. Indeed, there is no shortage of scholarship in teaching and learning from a wide range of disciplines that outlines and describes the pedagogical affordances of incorporating blogging activities as part of students’ educational experiences (see, for instance: Barton, 2005; Brownstein & Klein, 2006; Glogoff, 2005; Lamb & Johnson, 2006; Penrod, 2007). Presently, this social, literate practice is incorporated into more than just hybrid or online courses—blogging has become a central part of many face-to-face classroom experiences as well. In this section, therefore, we explore scholarship from a wide range of disciplines that attends to the definition and nature of blogging activity, and we identify the need for an expansion of the ways that blogging is theorized about as literate practice. We describe how some scholarship tends to characterize blogging as a literate practice in ways that are more ecological (Barton, 1994) than participatory. We evidence this by identifying how some scholarship overemphasizes the value of individual bloggers’ authorship and underemphasizes the role of audience as little more than voyeurs—all at the expense of cultivating broader participatory communities of practice.
 * Blogging not just diary but community http://www.digitalcultureandeducation.com/uncategorized/1023-mcnely_html_2010/ || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Some argue, for instance, that blogging facilitates: a stronger sense of classroom community (Blanchard, 2004; Glogoff, 2001), the nourishment of citizenship (Tryon, 2006), a “blurring of public and private modes of writing” (Fernheimer & Nelson, 2005, p. 1), and experiences in writing for “real and responsive audiences” (Sorapure, 2010, p. 60; see also Beach, Anson, Kastman, Lee, & Swiss, 2008). What is problematic in many of these characterizations of student blogging is not necessarily that there is an absence //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">of community, but that community is characterized as little more than audience in a performative sense. So while Downes (2004, p. 15) rightly argues that blogging is, or at least should be, “more than the online equivalent of a personal journal”, he goes on to argue that blogs are “in their purest form, the core of what has come to be called personal publishing”. Assumptions about blogging as a literate practice implicit in the above characterizations grant student bloggers little more than an amplified sense of “authorship” (Wrede, 2003); they do not necessarily or intentionally draw on the potential power of //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">participatory //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;"> knowledge-making. ||  ||
 * Blogging as collective intelligence || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">If online spaces, according to O’Reilly (2005), “harness collective intelligence”, and, according to Sorapure (2010, p. 60), “empower users through the formation of communities and the mass publication of user-generated content”, then theories about and practices of student blogging need to reposition students as more than self publishers of online reflections (Lindgren, 2005) and community as more than passive readers of said reflections. We identify a space in the existing scholarship, therefore, for practical models and future empirical investigations of the ways that blogging as a literate practice might be reconceived of as an opportunity for participants from a wide range of disciplinary and professional paths to merge around shared interest in current events, ideas, and places—what Clark (2010, p. 28) might call “the cultural and social imperative of ‘the now’”. We aim to move beyond an ecological approach to blogging as a literate practice and embrace in its place the kind of recursive, symbiotic relationship characteristic of public, participatory knowledge work. ||  ||
 * Blogging and Jenkins participatory || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">Jenkins et al. (2006, p. 7) provide the foundation for an understanding of participatory culture; they define this phenomenon as one:
 * 1) <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px; font-size: 12px;">With relatively low barriers to artistic expression and engagement
 * 2) <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px; font-size: 12px;">With strong support for creating and sharing one’s creations with others
 * 3) <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px; font-size: 12px;">With some type of informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experienced is passed along to novices
 * 4) <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px; font-size: 12px;">Where members believe that their contributions matter
 * 5) <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px; font-size: 12px;">Where members feel some degree of social connection with one another (at the least they care what people think about what they have created). ||   ||
 * Blogs as philosphy like an evolving species Levi Bryant http://philosophyinatimeoferror.com/2010/04/28/larval-subject-to-an-interview-levi-bryant/ || As for the scale and pace of human associations, and with respect to philosophy in particular, the blogosphere has tended towards overturning the hegemony of the academy or the university system. Traditionally philosophy has taken place in expensive and hard to obtain academic journals, difficult to find philosophy texts, and professional conferences that can be very expensive to attend. And by and large the “price of admission” in any of these venues has been an advanced degree of some sort. Further, in many cases articles in journals are seldom read, but you also get group networks of like-minded philosophers that begin controlling the content of journals, what articles will be published, what articles will not be published, and whose articles will be published.
 * Blogs as philosphy like an evolving species Levi Bryant http://philosophyinatimeoferror.com/2010/04/28/larval-subject-to-an-interview-levi-bryant/ || As for the scale and pace of human associations, and with respect to philosophy in particular, the blogosphere has tended towards overturning the hegemony of the academy or the university system. Traditionally philosophy has taken place in expensive and hard to obtain academic journals, difficult to find philosophy texts, and professional conferences that can be very expensive to attend. And by and large the “price of admission” in any of these venues has been an advanced degree of some sort. Further, in many cases articles in journals are seldom read, but you also get group networks of like-minded philosophers that begin controlling the content of journals, what articles will be published, what articles will not be published, and whose articles will be published.
 * Objects as things with powers || I conceptualize objects as “difference engines” or “generative mechanisms,” which is to say that I think them as //powers// or //capacities// of //doing// or //acting// in the world. I thus argue that objects are //split// or are split-objects. On the one hand, you have the actualized //qualities// or //properties// of an object which I call the “local manifestation” of the object, while on the other hand you have the powers or capacities of an object which I refer to as its “virtual proper being.” The substantiality of an object is not to be found in its qualities, but rather in the ensemble of its powers or capacities. This entails that we never directly encounter an object because no object ever actualizes the totality of its powers in all the ways in which those powers can become manifest. Rather, there is always a hidden excess or reserve of potentiality that dwells within the object. This is why I refer to the qualities of an object as local manifestations of the object. They are actualizations of the object at a particular point in time and under determinate conditions or relations to other objects. It follows then that qualities are //acts// on the part of an object. Qualities or properties are not something an object //has//, but are something that an object//does// when it relates to other objects in the world. ||  ||
 * Incredibly easy online publishing connection and Participation
 * Easy of use an forgetability
 * bLOGGING AS PUBLIC || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #ff6600; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11.3333330154419px;">**Frameworks of participatory action**
 * twitter AS WITH A LARGER PUBLIC || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #323232; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 11px;"> “The culture of Twitter is all about participation in a large public square”, boyd (2009, p. 5) argues, and our experience—and this very collaboration—is a result of such public participation. Ideas exchanged on Twitter have recursively informed our respective approaches to teaching and learning within digital culture. Using Twitter as our persistent backchannel (McNely, 2009), we began with a two-pronged strategy for incorporating participatory activities in ENG 444: (1) deploy Google Reader as a way to foster continuous conversation and student inquiry around course content, and (2) invoke a markedly public blogging approach as a way to explicitly encourage participation from beyond the confines of the course. ||  ||
 * rHYZOME
 * Code || ... the specific difference introduced by software/code is that it not only increases the speed and volume of these processes, it also introduces some novel dimensions: (1) . . . delegation of mental processes of high sophistication into computational systems. . . . (2) networked software, in particular, encourages a communicative environment of rapidly changing feedback mechanisms that tie humans and non-humans together into new aggregates. . . . (3) there is a greater use of embedded and quasi-visible technologies, leading to a rapid growth in the amount of quantification that is taking place in society. . . . This transforms our everyday lives into data, a resource to be used by others, usually for profit, which Heidegger terms // **standing-reserve** // (Heidegger 1993a: 322).
 * coding qualitatively for research as different from the programmer? || //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;"> [|Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook] [[image:http://ir-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/ir?t=spinuzziblogs-20&l=as2&o=1&a=1452257876 width="1" height="1"]] //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">, the classic Miles and Huberman sourcebook that Saldana recently updated. (I'll review that one soon too.)

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">In any case, this present book is all about //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">coding //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">, a move in qualitative research that involves interpreting, analyzing, and organizing data. "A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data" (p.3). It's primarily an interpretive act (p.4).

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">In Chapter 1, Saldana describes what coding is, what it involves, and how to use computer-aided qualitative data analysis software to implement it. He explains how coding represents an interpretive, analytical act and prescribes ways to code solo or as a team.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">In Chapter 2, he goes on to discuss analytic memos and their role in generating codes and categories of codes.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">Chapter 3 is where coding actually begins: Saldana describes first-cycle coding methods, "processes that happen during the initial coding of data" (p.58). By //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">methods //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">, Saldana essentially means discrete categories of coding approaches: grammatical, elemental, affective, literary & language, exploratory, and procedural methods. Each is associated with different types of codes. For instance, affective methods involves emotion coding, values coding, versus coding, and evaluation coding. That is, Saldana has developed an organized taxonomy of coding approaches that might be appropriate for different kinds of studies and research questions. ||  || Bots, bespoke code, and the materiality of software platforms Author: Geiger, R. Stuart, UC-Berkeley School of Information Publication Date: January 3, 2014 Series: UC Berkeley Previously Published Works Publication Info: Information, Communication & Society || a particular kind of bespoke code: bots, or fully automated software agents, which complicate many of the traditional distinctions and dichotomies we use when conceptualizing the role of software in society. Next, I argue that bots are a particularly vivid way of problematizing how discourses of ‘the platform’ attribute an always-already stability, unity, and existence to the software code that works to structure and constitute the interactions we have with each other in mediated environments. Like Latour's speed bumps (Latour, 1992), Becker's grand symphonies (Becker, 1982), or Bowker and Star's medical classification systems (Bowker & Star, 2000), I relate a more situated and materialist perspective, which illustrates how Wikipedia as a platform is a diverse and temporarily stabilized assemblage of code.......how bots and bespoke code operates alongside more established and formal regimes. Bots are situated; they come on the scene alongside more concrete systems, inserting themselves into average, everyday practices and platforms. Bots aren't usually part of some master plan – if they were, they probably wouldn't be bots. They often just seem like a good idea at the time, but you don't really know if they'll work until you try them. And when you first see a bot, you may not be sure how to react, or even what it is you're looking at. They may make you uneasy, and you may not be sure they even belong, especially if they insert themselves into a well-defined format or routine. It is easy to think of them as ancillary, non-essential add-ons, and sometimes they are indeed useless or annoying or just get in the way. But together, bots and software platforms like MediaWiki are more than the sum of their parts. Understanding this multiplicity requires moving between subject positions, discourses, and epistemologies. ||  || http://tapoc.sourceforge.net/progress/2012/06/notes_for_berry-philosophy_of_software.html . ||  || http://tapoc.sourceforge.net/progress/2012/06/notes_for_berry-philosophy_of_software.html || software is too often hidden behind a facade of flashing lights, deceptively simple graphic user interfaces (GUIs) and sleekly designed electronic gadgets that re-presents a world to the user || > which look at the way in which the notion of the author is problematized by the processural and bricolage nature of software development; different ways of understanding code. It will do sothrough a phenomenological approach that tries to highlight the // **pragmata** // of code. . . . Indeed, I argue that to understand the contemporary world, and the everyday practices that populate it, we need a corresponding focus on the computer code that is entangled with all aspects of our lives, including reflexivity about how much code is infiltrating the academy itself. ||
 * Widgets as particular forms like Anne Marie Mol
 * people only tangentially involved || To do this requires millions, if not billions of lines of computer code, many thousands of man-hours of work, and constant maintenance and technical support to keep it all running. These technical systems control and organize networks that increasingly permeate our society, whether financial, telecommunications, roads, food, energy, logistics, defense, water, legal or government. . . . [quoting Roger Bohn] “This is primarily 'database to database' information—people are only tangentially involved in most of it” (The Economist 20120d).
 * Software hidden by interfaces || computers and technologies is actually mediating its own relationship with the world through the panoply of software. These computers run software that is **spun like webs**, invisibly around us, organizing, controlling, monitoring and processing
 * || The challenge is to bring software back into visibility so that we can pay attention to both what it is (ontology), where it has come from (through media archeology and genealogy) but also what it is doing (through a form of **mechanology**), so we can understand this '**dynamic of organized inorganic matter**' (Stiegler 1998: 84). ||  ||
 * || Stiegler, the newest significant philosopher of computing introduced following Heidegger and Kittler, offers materialist definition, dynamic of organized inorganic matter, inviting pass through Burks, Goldstine, von Neumann; mechanology is a new philosophical position introduced without fanfare here. ||  ||
 * software studies, cultural analytics, and critical code studies || Comparable to list //__**Hayles makes in How We Think**__//: platform studies, media archeology, software engines, soft authorship, genre analysis of software, graphical user interfaces, digital code literacy, emporality and code, sociology and political economy of the free software and open source movement. This enumeration could found the literature review for the prospectus. || how do these play out in learning ???? Do we care or need to have thses??? ||
 * || * software studies/cultural analytics (Fuller 2003; Manovich 2001, 2008)
 * critical code studies (Marino 2006; Montfort 2009)
 * platform studies (Montfort and Bogost 2009; Gillespie 2008) where there is a critical engagement with an 'infrastructure that supports the design and use of particular applications, be it computer hardware, operating systems, gaming devices, mobile devices, and digital disc formats' (Gillespie 2008)
 * media archeology (Parikka 2007) which uncovers histories and genealogies of media, insisting on researching differences rather than continuity (Parikka 2007)
 * software engines (Helmond 2008) //software engines//, which form an increasing part of the way in which software is packaged to perform a wide variety of functions, e.g. gaming engines, search engines, etc. (Helmond 2008)
 * 'soft' authorship (Huber 2008)
 * genre analysis of software (Douglas 2008)
 * graphical user interfaces (Bratton 2008; Chun 2008; Dix et al 2003; Manovich 2001; Manovich and Douglas 2009) which focuses on the human-computer interface and the machine (Bratton 2008; **Chun** 2008; Dix et al 2003; Manovich 2001; Manovich and Douglas 2009)
 * digital code literacy (Hayles 2004; Hayles 2005; Montfort 2008) (to which I add Applen and McDaniel 200x)w hich investigates how people read and write digital forms (Hayles 2004; Hayles 2005; Montfort 2008)
 * temporality and code (Raley 2008) (along with which I consider alien temporalities of machine embodiment)
 * sociology and political economy of the free software and open source movement (Berry 2008; Chopra and Dexter 2008; Coleman 2009; Kelty 2008; Lessig 2002; May 2006; Weber 2005). the sociology and political economy of the free software and open source movement, particularly with respect to the way in which the software has been rethought and subject to deliberation and contestation (Berry 2008; Chopra and Dexter 2008; Coleman 2009; Kelty 2008; Lessig 2002; May 2006; Weber 2005). ||  ||
 * ephemerality, || ephemerality, both of source code revisions and entire operating environments, and high technical skill requirement. The latter I claim requires lots of practice, such as developed through employment developing software and extreme hobbyist activity such as in free, open source software projects. Good statement of significance of the undertaking, including examining influence on academics itself. || 5-6 looking at computer code is difficult due to its ephemeral nature, the high technical skills required of the researcher and the lack of analytical or methodological tools available.....
 * study, imbricating classic Socratic questioning for tracing agentic paths constituting human experience. || 6-9) The way in which these technologies are recording data about individuals and groups is remarkable, both in terms of the collection of: (1) formal technical data, such as dataflows, times and dates, IP addresses, geographical information, prices, purchases and preferences, etc.; (2) but also qualitative feelings and experiences. . . . This information is not collected passively, but processed and related back into the experience of other users either as a news feed or data stream, or else as an information support for further use of the software. || without an understanding of how computation is tying data, news, practices and search results together through computer code, the process of 'search' is difficult to explain, if not strangely magical. It also precludes us from concentrating on the political economic issues raised by the fact that an American corporation is capturing this data in the first place, and is able to feed it back through pre-populating the search box and hence steer people in particular directions. ||
 * || Google creates advertising markets by the real-time segmentation of search requiring computer power to understand who, in terms of a particular consumer group, is searching and what can be advertised to them. Google, therefore, harnesses the power of computation to drive an aggressive advertising strategy to find out who the user is, and what are their preferences, tastes, desires, and wants. . . . To understand these kinds of issues, which are essentially about the regulation of computer code itself, we need to be able to unpack the way in which these systems are built and run. This means a closer attention to the multiple ways in which code is deployed and used in society. || Code, better software, material because it transforms media. Who will do this? Turn those already familiar with working code into philosophers, and train young people as programmers so they might become technically skilled philosophers. As Hayles (or is it Berry) points out, the shortage or gap may not be with money, but time, or competence. ||
 * || (9-10) Therefore, it seems to me that we need to become more adept at // reading // and // writing // computer code in order to fully understand the technical experiences of the everyday world today. . . . Without this expertise, when tracing the **agentic path**, whether from cause to effect, or through the narrative arcs that are used to explain our contemporary lives, we will miss a crucial translation involved in the technical mediation provided by software. . . . Code is not a medium that // contains // the other mediums, rather it is a medium that radically reshapes and transforms them into a new unitary form. || how our being-in-the-world, the way in which we act towards the world, is made possible through the application of these theoretical computational techniques, which are manifested in the processes, structures and ideas stabilized by software and code. ||
 * // **computationality** // of code || 10 in other words, the way in which code is actually 'doing' is vitally important, and we can only understand this by actually**reading** the code itself and **watching** how it operates. As a contribution to developing our understanding of what is admittedly a complex subject, I take a synoptic look at the phenomena of code, and try to place it within phenomenological context to understand the profound ways in which computational devices are changing the way in which we run our politics, societies, economies, the media and even everyday life. ||  ||
 * //**not**// // **computationalism** //, , || //**not interested in**//

// **computationalism (anthropomorphism -possibly ### like Stephen Downes)** // a relatively recent doctrine that emerged in analytic philosophy in the mid 1990s, and which argues that the human mind is ultimately 'characterizable as a kind of computer' (**Golumbia** 2009: 8) || (12-13) Although I will not be looking in detail at the questions raised by analog computation, nor the digital philosophy of **Fredkin** and others, these examples demonstrate the increasing importance of the digital in how people are conceptualizing the world. . . . These metaphors help us understand the world, and with a shift to computational metaphors, certain aspects of reality come to the fore, such as the notion of orderliness, calculability, and predictability, whilst others, like chaos, desire and uncertainty, retreat into obscurity. ||
 * distributed cognition || distinction between computationalist and instrumentalist notions of reason, locating the former in the materially entangled matrix operations of distributed cognition, and the latter in a more restricted sense of a type of agency. || instrumental rationality is a mode of reasoning employed by an agent. In contrast, computational rationality is a special sort of knowing, it is essentially vicarious, taking place within other actors or combinations and networks of actors (which may by human or non-human) and formally algorithmic. . . . This means that the location of reasoning is highly distributed across technical devices and agents. This strongly **entangles** the computational with the everyday world; after all, only a limited number of computational tasks are self-contained and have no user or world input. . . . In this sense then, computational rationality is a form of reasoning that takes place through other non-human objects, but these objects are themselves able to exert agential features, either by making calculations and decisions themselves, or by providing communicative support for the user.
 * 1) How does this apply to Facebook or to Twitter ||
 * Cognition and what it occludes Latour || Latour famously proposed in Science in Action that we institute a ten-year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science and technology. (Hakkarainen criticized this moratorium in a 2003 Science and Education issue, complaining that Latour mentions this moratorium every so often, always extending it for ten years.) This moratorium came out of Latour's observations of scientific work, in which he noticed that scientists would assemble a large array of nonhumans and humans—instruments, procedures, lab techs, etc.—to perform science, then attribute the results to cognition. Without all of these nonhuman and human intermediaries, Latour argued, cognition could not have provided an adequate explanation.

Let's use an analogy. Suppose that as you walk home, you spot your neighbor on the roof. Do you think to yourself, "I am amazed that my neighbor can jump so high!" Or do you look for a ladder? Analogically speaking, Latour always looks for the ladder. He sees the alternate explanation—based entirely on human ability—as rather implausible. Yes, it's always a possibility, but (Latour might say) let's look for the ladder first. ||  || (22) Instead, reasoning could change to more conceptual or communicational method of reasoning, for example, by bringing together comparative and communicative analysis from different disciplinary perspectives and knowing how to use technology to achieve a result that can be used—a rolling process of reflexive thinking and collaborative thinking. Relying on technology in a more radically decentered way, depending on technical devices to fill in the blanks in our minds and to connect knowledge in new ways, would change our understanding of knowledge, wisdom and intelligence itself. It would be a radical decentering in some ways, as the Humboldtian subject filled with culture and a certain notion of rationality, would no longer exist, rather, the**computational subject** would know where to recall culture as and when it was needed in conjunction with computationally available others, a //just-in-time// cultural subject, perhaps, to feed into a certain form of connected //computationally// supported thinking through and visualized presentation. || (27) Metaphysics, grasped ontotheologically, 'temporarily secures the intelligible order' by understanding it 'ontologically', from the inside out, and 'theologically' from the outside in, which allows for the formation of an epoch, a 'historical constellation of intelligibility which is unified around its ontotheological understanding of the being of entities' (**Thomson** 2009: 150). ||  || perl poem, // Listen // || (29) The perl poem, // Listen //, shown below, demonstrates some of the immediate problems posed by an object that is at once both literary and machinic (Hopkins n.d.). // Source code // is the textual form of programming code that is edited by computer programmers. The first difficulty of understanding code, then, is in the interpretation of code as a ** textual artifact **. . . . The second difficulty is studying something in process, as it executes or 'runs' on a computer, and so the poem // Listen // has a second articulation as a ** running program ** distinct from the textual form. ||  || Conceive absolute code like Marx absolute labor and problematic like Marxian analysis of industrial production; technical, social, material, and symbolic aspects. || Programmers have tended to need to continually use this **hermeneutic circle** of understanding 'the parts', 'the whole' and the 'parts in terms of the whole' in order to understand and write code (and communicate with each other), and this is striking in its similarity to literary creativity, to which it is sometimes compared. . . . Object oriented techniques, such as object oriented design (OOD), have certainly contributed to changing the way people think about software, but when people undertake OOD it is in the sense of absolute code. . . . So, although an expressive medium, computer languages remain constrained in what may be 'said' due to the requirements that the computer in the final instance understands it. . . . Also computer programming can be an intensely social activity in addition to the perceived loneliness of the computer programmer. . . . Code is therefore technical and social, and material and symbolic simultaneously. This is not a new problem but it does make code difficult to investigate and study, and similar to understanding industrial production as Marx explained. || (36-37) Rather, code needs to be approached in its multiplicity, that is, as a literature, a mechanism, a spatial form (organization), and as a repository of social norms, values, patterns and processes. . . . Due to improvements over the last forty years or so, programmers can now take advantage of tools and modular systems that have been introduced into programming through the mass engineering techniques of Fordism. . . . through the study of code we can learn a lot about the structure and processes of our post-Fordist societies through the way in which certain social formations are actualized through crystallization in computer code.
 * agonistic form of communicative action || (14) In a certain sense, this is an agonistic form of communicative action where devices are in a constant stream of data flow and decision-making which may only occasionally feedback to the human user. || (14) This '**everyday computational**' is a **comportment** towards the world that takes as its subject-matter everyday objects which it can transform through calculation and processing interventions. . . . This reminds us that computation is limited to specific temporal durations and symbolic sets of discrete data to represent reality, but once encoded, it can be resampled, transformed, and filtered endlessly. ||
 * || (14-15) This demonstrates the plasticity of digital forms and points toward a new way of working with representation and mediation, facilitating the digital folding of reality. . . . In other words, a computer requires that everything is transformed from the continuous flow of our everyday reality into a grid of numbers that can be stored as a representation of reality which can then be manipulated using algorithms. The other side of the coin, of course, is that these subtractive methods of understanding reality ( // episteme // ) produce new knowledges and methods for the control of reality ( // techne // ) ||  ||
 * set of functions (affordances) in a computational device is always a partial offering || (15) In a similar way to physical objects, technical devices present the user a certain function . . . but this set of functions (affordances) in a computational device is always a partial offering that may be withheld or remain unperformed. This is because the device has an internal state which is generally withheld from view and is often referred to as a 'black box', indicating that it is opaque to the outside view. || (16) This demonstrates the // **double mediation** // which makes the user increasingly reliant on the screen image that the computer produces, but also renders them powerless to prevent the introduction of errors and mistakes (unless they have access to the computer code). ||
 * || much of the code that we experience in our daily lives is presented through a visual interface that tends to be graphical and geometric, and where haptic, through touch, currently responds through rather static physical interfaces but dynamic visual ones, or example iPads, touch screen phones, etc. ||  ||
 * Turing (1950) described as **super-critical** modes of thought. || 20 The digital assemblages that are now being built, not only promise great change at the level of the individual human actor. They provide destabilizing amounts of knowledge and information that lack the regulating force of philosophy that, Kant argued, ensures that institutions remain rational. . . . This introduces not only a moment of societal disorientation with individuals and institutions flooded with information, but also offer a computational solution to them in the form of computational rationalities, what Turing (1950) described as **super-critical** modes of thought. || (21) This is not the collective intelligence discussed by Levy (1999), rather, it is the promise of a collective // intellect // . This is reminiscent of the medieval notion of the // universitatis //, but recast in a digital form, as a society or association of actors who can think critically together mediated through technology. ||
 * || Lakatosian computational 'hard core' (Lakatos 1980). . . . Perhaps we are beginning to see reading and writing computer code as part of the pedagogy required to create a new subject produced by the university, a // computational // or // data-centric // subject. || New distributed, computational subjectivity, necessarily dehumanizing, but also only potentially democratizing.
 * Latour and others have rightly identified the domestication of the human mind that took place with pen and paper (Latour 1986). || (22-23) This doesn't have to be dehumanizing. Latour and others have rightly identified the domestication of the human mind that took place with pen and paper (Latour 1986). . . . Computational techniques could give us greater powers of thinking, larger reach for our imaginations, and, possibly, allow us to reconnect to political notions of equality and redistribution based on the potential of computation to give to each according to their need and to each according to their ability. || 'tools as offering provocations, surfacing evidence, suggesting patterns and structures, or adumbrating trends' (Unsworth, quoted in Clement // et al // . 2008). . . . This is a distinction that **Moretti** (2007) referred to as // distant // versus // close // readings of texts. . . . Computational approaches facilitate disciplinary hybridity that leads to a post-disciplinary university that can be deeply unsettling to traditional academic knowledge. . . . Indeed, there is a cultural dimension to this process and as we become more used to computational visualizations, we will expect to see them and use them with confidence and fluency. . . . This is a subject that is highly computationally communicative and able to access, process and visualize information and results quickly and effectively. At all levels of society, people will increasingly have to turn data and information into usable computational forms in order to understand it at all. ||
 * ** Computationality might then be understood as an ontotheology ** || (27) Here, following Heidegger, I want to argue that there remains a location for the possibility of philosophy to explicitly question the ontological understanding of what the computational is in regard to the positive sciences. **Computationality might then be understood as an ontotheology**, creating a new ontological 'epoch' as a new historical constellation of intelligibility.
 * code as textual artifact then code as RUNNING
 * 'prescriptive code'. || 31-32 'software' to include commercial products and proprietary applications, such as operating systems, applications or fixed products of code such as Photoshop, Word and Excel, which I also call 'prescriptive code'. . . . Or to put it slightly different, code implies a close reading of technical systems and software implies a form of distant reading. . . code is the **static textual form** of software, and software is the **processual** operating form. ||  ||
 * || Berry follows Latour for wide range multiple conceptions of software.
 * ** double mediation ** || similar to Sterne, Latour, others, extending from discrete object analysis to cultural context, invoking Wardrip-Fruin as another philosopher of computing. Further complicated by double mediation (Kittler on media).

(37) This means that software is mediating the relationship with code and the writing and running of it. When we study code we need to be attentive to this **double mediation** and be prepared to include a wider variety of materials in our analysis of code than just the textual files that have traditionally been understood as code. ||  || (38) This, perhaps, gives us our first entry point into an understanding of code; it is a declarative and comparative mechanism that 'ticks' through each statement one at-a-time. || (42) Software, therefore, always has the possibility of instability being generated from within its different logics. Even when it is functioning, code is not always 'rational'. ||  || (43) So software too can suffer a kind of death, its traces only found in discarded diskette, the memories of the retired programmers, their notebooks, and personal collections of code printouts and manuals. ||  || (44) These methods of habit become deeply ingrained in the way in which a programmer will tackle a computing problem ........  editing environments or computer platforms (e.g. Unix). . . . This has been reinforced by marketing efforts which use 'fear, uncertainty, and doubt' (FUD) to encourage customer loyalty. // **Through structural constraints (e.g. IDE, compiler)** // (44-45) In addition to the habituation and education of programmers are the constraints offered by the programming environments themselves which can be very unforgiving. . . . Code therefore requires a very high degree of proof-reading ability in order to ensure the correctness of the program under development. . . . We can think of this as a form of prescribed literate programming. ||  || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px;">As the hybrid progeny of a variety of social, human and technical elements, code is increasingly invested with a kind of performative social power that gives software the capacity to enact tasks, make decisions, and, in part, mediate how people see, know and do things. The apparent capacity of code and its algorithmic procedures to interweave with society, act upon people, augment knowledge, and to mediate and govern their lives in myriad ways, especially in relation to education, is the basis for our inquiry. Before it can do such things, though, how does it even ‘know’ enough about the people it is to act upon? How does code know you? How does software see us? || http://codeactsineducation.wordpress.com/2014/01/30/how-code-knows-you/ <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px;">A decade ago, the designers <span style="color: #743399; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;">[|Dan O’Sullivan and Tom Igoe] <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px;"> asked the question ‘how does the computer see us?’ The image of a hand with one finger, one eye, and two ears that they produced—a simple yet weirdly obscene <span style="color: #743399; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px; vertical-align: baseline;">[|finger-eye-being] <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia,'Bitstream Charter',serif; font-size: 16px;">—is a striking reminder that technologies carry programmed assumptions and knowledge about the human beings who will use them. Computers and software interact with us as its producers have instructed and programmed it to see and identify us. ||  ||
 * sequential concept fetch and execute cycle || Definition based on sequential concept fetch and execute cycle; Manovich media performances processual context of code. || Code is therefore connective, mediating and constructing our media experiences in real-time as software. Code must then be understood in context, as something that is in someway potentially running for it to // be // code. Code is processual, and keeping in mind its execution and agentic form is crucial to understanding the way in which it is able to both structure the world and continue to act upon it.
 * || (38-39) The external 'real' world must be standardized and unified in a formal manner which the code is able to process and generate new data and information – and this we can trace. This is where a phenomenology of code, or more accurately a ** phenomenology of computation **, allows us to understand and explore the ways in which code is able to structure experience in concrete ways. ||  ||
 * code not always rational || (40-41) Thirdly, it is important to note that software breaks down, continually. . . . The implications are interesting; much software written today never reaches a working state, indeed a great quantity of it remains hidden unused or little understood within the code repositories of large corporate organizations.
 * Software lifecycle includes moral depreciation of code borrowed from Marx; complexity through distributed authorship over many revisions means it is likely that nobody comprehends all of any given application. || (42) Therefore, and lastly, software, contrary to common misconceptions, follows a cycle of life. It is not eternal, nor could it be. It is created as code, it is developed whilst it is still productive, and slowly it grows old and decays, what we might call the // **moral depreciation** // of code (Marx 2004: 528).
 * materialized as part of programming practices. || // **Through habituation/training/education** //
 * http://codeactsineducation.wordpress.com/2014/01/30/how-code-knows-you/
 * http://www.newmediastudies.nl/magazine/editorial-04-digital-artifacts

For scholars of ANT our contemporary world is so “pervasively fabricated” (Cuellar 2010, 148) by tools and technologies that our social construction cannot separate humans from the machines. For Latour, machines have always been part of society. || http://www.newmediastudies.nl/magazine/editorial-04-digital-artifacts

Based on the concept of non-human agency, central to his work is the notion that machines also possess social dimensions. Both humans and techniques are seen as actors in “chains of associations” (Latour 1991) in which they form relations and shape each other. In this view, there is no clear distinction between humans and machines, between facts and concepts, material and immaterial – only paths, trails and transformations. The concept of the agency of technologies is also supported by sociologist Madeleine Akrich (Akrich 1994). According to Akrich, technical objects “participate in building heterogeneous networks” (Akrich 1994, 206) of humans and non-humans which, when stabilized become “instruments of knowledge” (ibid, 221). For Latour, the social is embedded in the machines and, in his view, technologies are “full of people” (Latour 1991). || http://www.newmediastudies.nl/magazine/editorial-04-digital-artifacts

Techniques are not mere objects but complex networks that have a story and programme of actions, “goals and functions” (Latour 1994, 34). Machines carry a certain meaning inscribed by their inventors. According to Latour, each artifact “has a script” or an “affordance” (ibid, 31). The term “affordance” is defined by Donald Norman as “the possible actions a person can perform upon an object” (Norman 2010, 2008). For Latour, the affordance is the potential of artifacts to allow or forbid certain actions and the ability to force humans to “play roles” (ibid, 31). || <span style="font-family: Arial,serif; font-size: 13px; vertical-align: baseline;">Abstract > Despite the proliferation of social media research in the past decade, surprisingly little has been said about the role of application programming interfaces (APIs) – the protocological objects enabling the ‘regimes of sharing’ characteristic of these media platforms. APIs are//used//, but seldom critically scrutinized as such. Developing a software studies approach, this article engages with the ways in which the stuff of software – in this case APIs – can be said to allow for, encourage, or block certain kinds of actions and relations. Exploring the particular case of the Twitter APIs, and drawing on qualitative interviews with members of its third-party developer ecosystem, this article asks how APIs form and hold relations together and how we may understand the coordinative work that these protocols do. Seeing APIs as reminiscent of what Michel Serres’ terms the quasi-object, the notion that objects act as catalysts for various social relations and actions, provides an interpretative framework for investigating the organizing potentials of protocological objects. The argument is made that the Twitter APIs constitute objects of intense feeling – highly meaningful entities that are invested with various forms of contestation and identification, desires and disappointments. The Twitter APIs do not merely give rise to new collectives, enlisting different actors to engage in different types of work. The APIs also regulate the playing field of what can happen where and when, what can be built technically, and policy-wise, by constituting an infrastructure for innovation and sharing. || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">there is a discussion near the end about an API as a "quasi-object", <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">comparable to the ball in a game. it's passed between players, and <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">without it the game wouldn't exist.
 * <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #545454; font-family: arial,sans-serif; font-size: small;">Only by contributing with theoretical and empirical accounts of specific stuff and their ..... came from very different educational and professional backgrounds (i.e.high .... for the most part seemed to agree that the Twitter APIs were 'simple' to learn..... Reassembling the Social: An introduction to actor-network theory, Oxford: || <span style="font-family: Arial,serif; font-size: 13px; vertical-align: baseline;">My article “<span style="color: #000000; font-family: inherit; font-size: 13px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">[|Objects of intense feeling: The case of the Twitter API] “, has just been published online in// Computational Culture: a journal of software studies //.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">my feeling is that there isn't such a clear separation between the <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">"ball" and the "stadium" -- the api and platform, or whatever terms <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">you want to use. every technology that we build on requires a sort of <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">social contract that the technology will continue existing. whether <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">this means web apis, browser specifications, or plugin support (e.g., <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">flash, java), or even processor architectures (apples switch from <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">powerpc to intel being an example). there is no focal point, just <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">varying degrees of complexity required for replacing each <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">component/layer.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">a web api appears complex because it hides a complex system behind it. <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">but this doesn't mean it's a focal point of the tools built on it, <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">just that it's a more risky/entrenched kind of social contract. ||
 * || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Among other things, web APIs encompass: a physicality in terms of the corporeal landscape of infrastructure and technology, through to the economic logics at work (i.e. business models, ownership, licencing of the APIs), functions and services (i.e. access to data), practices of users (i.e. forms of labor, play and collaboration), discursive formations (i.e. statements, knowledge, ideas), rules and norms (i.e. design principles, terms of service, technical standards), as well as social imaginaries and desires.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">An API is never a neutral tool. Rather, an API is the result of complex sociomaterial negotiations and practices that embodies specific values. While APIs do nothing by themselves, they are not objective in any way.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">APIs are also future-oriented. The kind of ‘openness’ invoked here, is not one of access or ‘free’, but of anticipation. ‘Just open it up and see what happens’ I would argue, signifies a certain kind of openness towards the future, where APIs are essentially deployed to ask developers to reimagine existing services and to transform them into new realities.

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #222222; display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;">Not only do APIs invite developers to reimagine their services, they are deliberately constructed around an ethos of participation. As such, web APIs constitute key techniques for governing developers into paths of desired productivity. ||  ||
 * Teaching Arts and Science with the New Social Media

Micro-Blogging and the Higher Education Classroom: Approaches and Considerations

Gavan P.L. Watson

Adopted by educators in higher education,

Twitter has been used as: an object for study, a tool to communicating

classroom announcements, as a way to enable student to reflect on their

learning, a chance to get instant feedback from students, and as the

specific tool used to facilitate in-class conversations. The ongoing use of

micro-blogging also appears to have an ability to change the social

dynamics of a classroom, expanding the social of the classroom beyond

the physical. ||  ||   || the term social media technology (SMT) || social media technology (SMT) refers to web-basedand mobile applications that allow individuals and organizations to create, engage, and sharenew user-generated or existing content, in digital environments through multi-way communication.It is important to note the difference between user-generated content, which is non-traditionalmedia developed and produced by individual users, and existing content, which is usuallytraditional media (news, magazines, radio, and television) reproduced for the web. In addition tothese features, SMT also contains design elements that create virtual social spaces encouraginginteraction, thereby broadening the appeal of the technology and promoting transitions back and forth from the platform to face-to-face engagement. || The use of social media interfaces through computer and mobile devices has become quitewidespread, and currently, the two most prominent interfaces are Facebook and Twitter.Facebook allows users to create profiles; allows those user-operated profiles to interact with eachother; allows for the expression of interests and the discovery of commonalities between users; andallows users to build and maintain connections and invite others to join a community. In contrast,Twitter is a social media interface that enables users to share a limited amount of user-generatedcontent, quickly and easily, to an extensive number of other users. With this interface, thecommunication exchange is central, and the creation and sharing of user profiles is not necessary,but Twitter can link to user profiles that exist on other social media interfaces ||
 * Definition
 * Chapter heading: Networks || spinuzzi http://spinuzzi.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/network-implications-for-workers.html

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">that's been burning a lot of my time right now is the notion of work organization. It's easy enough—and true, I think—to say that many organizations are moving away from institutional hierarchies and toward networks. There's a truly cross-disciplinary issue, and people from management, sociology, and even warfare studies would agree with that statement (with some caveats). But when you take the lid off of this surface agreement, it's a mess. People mean different things by "network." People have different accounts for how this shift from hierarchies to networks is happening (just search this blog for names such as Toffler, Ronfeldt, Mintzberg, Quinn, Boisot...). And people have different historical-developmental accounts as well—part of why I've been reading books by cultural anthropologists lately. ||  ||
 * || <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">So there's two ways to handle this kind of disagreement. One is to close the lid, close the discussion, and pick what you like from the sources, leaving the rest. ("Here's what //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">I //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">mean by network, and here's what people say about it.") The other is to throw the lid wide open, disentangle the differences and get some sense of why they're there, accept the discordances, and hedge appropriately so that you can build terms based on these. ("Here's what //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">I //<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;"> mean by network—and here's why I picked this definition, how it differs from many other definitions, and why.")

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">I prefer the second route, which tends to be very time-consuming, but results in clearer and cleaner definitions. The first route is popular, but <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #8c4600; font-family: Georgia,serif; text-decoration: none;">[|I don't think the results are as good] <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #0c0600; font-family: Georgia,serif;">. ||  || In terms of classroom communication and second language learning, a knotworking model of negotiation might be used to develop students’ ability to adapt to ever-changing language contexts and situations. Since, as Engestrom states: “Negotiation is required when the very object of the activity is unstable, resists attempts at control and standardization, and requires rapid integration of expertise from various locations and traditions” (p. 9). || 204
 * || According to Spinuzzi, communication in networks can be analyzed in terms of both actor-network theory and activity theory. Latour’s Actor-network theory presents communication as a rhizomatic structure without clearly determined structural bonds or hierarchy, i.e. without beginning and end, with communication participants (network nodes) being “assemblages of humans and nonhumans, any person, artifact, practice”. In terms of this theory, the piece of writing such as fax or e-mail is the same node in the network as an interlocutor of a conversation. On the contrary, activity theory is close to speech acts theory since it presents pieces of communication as activities leading to potential changes, and developing in various socio-cultural and historical contexts. Speaking about contexts, Spinuzzi mentions multiple interpretations of a message spreading through the nodes, and brings about Engestrom’s term “polycontextuality” || That brings us back to Engestrom’s work and his key concept “negotiated knotworking”, by which he determines relations between communicants (and genres) as a way to organize effective work. This work is centered on c-configuration, i.e. bringing about change as a process of constant interaction and collaboration. Enegstrom affirms that effective communication (i.e. communication that brings visible results in form of completed activity) is based on negotiation and peer reviewing; it is not rigidly structured and not easily controlled. Engestrom’s concept of “mycorrhizae” in terms of negotiation and participation in social networking activities makes me think of communication as an idea that expands into conversation, and then, into polylogue growing out of different perceptions and world views.
 * AT and ANT Spinuzzi || Spinuzzi develops the ‘God terms’ o his comparison in themost pedagogically riendly section o the book. Activity theorists, he argues,tend to view actions as weaves, movements o atomistic humans gainingcompetency. Weaves are based in conict and subsequent, irreversible evolu-tion that resolves the conict. For activity theorists, “development precedes andunderpins political-rhetorical interests” (p. 67).Splicing, the operative metaphor

Network: Theorizing Knowledge Work in Telecommunications or ANT, organizes phenomena in alliances o humans and nonhumans thatcontinually orm and end. For actor-network theorists, Spinuzzi posits, “political-rhetorical interests precede and underpin development

”

(67). Actor-network theory explains power relations as a consequence o a system while activitytheory explains the system as an exercise o human power. ||  || http://networksf12.mixxt.com/networks/blog/post.olga.leonteac:5 || First of all, he describes the situation of starting to write: “we start in the middle of things – pressed by our colleagues, strangled by deadlines. And most of the things we have been studying, we have ignored or misunderstood”.
 * Latour on writing

Latour turns to differentiation between writers creating (in his term) good and bad texts. “What is a good textual account?” It seems that in academic research writing it is not that much important for texts being subjective or objective. Therefore, instructors, who forbid their students be influenced by subjective perceptions and feelings when writing a research essay (Don’t just tell me ‘I like this’, but explain why you held this opinion), are not fully correct. By forbidding students express their individual personality in the essays, they gain the effect of a badly written text, i.e. “scholars strive to imitate the sloppy writings” of other scientists (writers).

In Latour’s opinion, a good text is the one that “traces a network”, “a narrative or a description or a proposition where all the actors do something and don’t just sit there”. A good text “transforms” things and effects instead of “transporting them”. Finally, a text is “a test on how many actors the writer is able to treat as mediators and how far he or she is able to achieve the social”. In other words, when writing a research essay, a student need to refrain from summarizing the sources, but rather put them in conversation, and through this conversation and analysis of sources, come to discovering of some new truths and perspectives, make the sources “act” and connect to one another mediating ideas.

The text network is “an indicator of a text about topics at hand”, allowing the writer and the reader “to trace a set of relations” between agents and activities. Latour defines a writer’s task in providing with equal mastery “an actor-network account of different topics” – those that seemingly have nothing in common to create a network such as a symphony, an engraving, a rock from the moon, in parallel with those that are undeniably actants of a network (technology network: e-mails, television, satellites). For this, a writer needs to be able to analyze the effects and causes, associations causing nodes in the network to connect, and actors to be mediators of ideas.A writer is doing all this using translation as a type of mediation between sources.

In a “bad” text “nothing is translated from one to another since action is simply carried through”, i.e. there is not analysis or synthesis, just mere description instead. On the contrary, in a “good” text “a weak and powerless account that simply repeats is re-vitalized and random elements and ideas are transported from one to another creating a whole body of skillful synthesis (“a flow of translations”), in which:
 * 1) A point-to-point connection is established;
 * 2) Such a connection leaves empty most of what is not connected;
 * 3) This connection requires an effort (Latour, p. 132). ||   ||
 * Participants as charateristics of a network community || # Nodes linked by strong and weak ties (Barabasi)
 * 1) Nodes-connectors with anomalously large number of links (Barabasi)
 * 2) Autonomous interconnected agents in complex relations with one another (Galloway)
 * 3) “Subjects as individual people are particular modes of individuation, to which sets of values are ascribed: agency, autonomy, self-consciousness, reason, emotion, rights and so on” (Galloway, p. 38)
 * 4) Latour: Spokespersons who speak for the group existence (31); Intermediaries –what transports meaning or force without transformation (39); Mediators – transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry (39)
 * 5) Agents and agencies (Latour) ||   ||
 * Activities || __II Activities__
 * 1) Individuals doing something: searching for information, making decisions(Watts)
 * 2) Social ties and associations; translations between mediators (Latour)
 * 3) “Making differences to a state of affairs” (Latour, 52)
 * 4) Characteristics of actions in a network (Latour):
 * Action is other-taken, taken up by others and shared with the masses (45)
 * Action should remain a surprise, a mediation, an event (45)
 * Action is dislocated, borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, etc. (46)
 * 1) Manage to complete the task through miscommunications (Spinuzzi)
 * 2) Mediation as controlling one’s behavior from “the outside” through physical and psychological tools (Spinuzzi)
 * 3) Transformative self-mediated work (Spinuzzi) ||   ||
 * __Attributes__ || __III Attributes__
 * 1) Unevenness of connection between nodes (Barabasi)
 * 2) Continuous hierarchy of nodes (Barabasi)
 * 3) Dynamic interactions along the links (Barabasi, 225)
 * 4) Watts: order as compromise or negotiation (Galloway) and disorder as “possibility of certain choices”
 * 5) Growth and preferential attachment (Watts, 55)
 * 6) Robust and flexible (Galloway)
 * 7) “Distributed sovereignty, the idea that control and organization are disseminated outward into a relatively large number of small local decisions” (Galloway, 46).
 * 8) Point-to-point connection that requires effort and leaves out everything that is not connected (Latour, 132) ||   ||
 * Structure || __IV Structure__
 * 1) Pattern of relations between individuals such as mapping of underlying preferences and characteristics (Watts, 48)
 * 2) Organized around the principle of perpetual inclusion (Galloway, 60)
 * 3) Information at the core (Galloway)
 * 4) Knotworking (Spinuzzi) ||   ||
 * The practice ture || <span style="background-color: #efefef; color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">The 'practice turn' (Schatzki et al., 2001) has contributed to a deeper appreciation of performativity and the respective role of human agents and material artefacts in organizational practice. Within the practice turn, 'sociomateriality' emerged as a lens for conceptualizing the texture of organizational practice, arguing for the constitutive entanglement of human agents and material artefacts (Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). One of the most important contributions of the sociomateriality debate has been the subsequent problematization of 'materiality', which extended a long tradition of questioning the prominence of human agency in social practices (Latour, 2005). This revived interest has given way to insightful contributions on how the ‘material’ matters in organizational practice (Carlile et al., 2013; de Vaujany & Mitev, 2013; Leonardi et al., 2012). ||  ||
 * || * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Materiality as ground, occasion, resource, offshoot of the examined practice
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Obligation, responsibility and relations of accountability in the examined practice
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Reason, affect and the body in the interplay between the social and the material
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Forms of self-awareness and relation to materiality
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Temporality, materiality and reflexivity
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Digital artefacts, digital actors, digital environments
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Dichotomies, reflexivity and responsibility
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">The examined practice of the researcher: concerns and considerations in theorizing the social and the material
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">The examined practice of the researcher: concerns and considerations in theorizing the social and the material

<span style="color: #061540; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; vertical-align: baseline;">References
code format="tw-data-text vk_txt tw-ta tw-text-small" Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really the idea of distinct objects ; Aberer summarizes human activity itself as objective activity. ( Feuerbach wishes to treat material objects as distinctively different from the conceptual, but he fails to apprehend human activity Itself as object -directed . ) Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach code ||  ||
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Carlile, P.R., Nicolini, D., Langley, A., & Tsoukas, H. (eds.) (2013): // How Matter Matters: Objects, Artifacts, and Materiality in Organization Studies //. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">De Vaujany, F., & Mitev, N. (eds.) (2013): // Materiality and Space: Organizations, Artefacts and Practices //. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Introna, L. (2002): "The (im)possibility of ethics in the information age." // Information and Organization, // 12 (2), 71–84.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Introna, L. (2007): "Maintaining the reversibility of foldings: Making the ethics (politics) of information technology visible." // Ethics and Information Technology, // 9, 11–25.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Latour, B. (2005): // Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory //. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Leonardi, P.M., Nardi, B.A., & Kallinikos, J. (eds.) (2012): // Materiality and Organizing: Social Interaction in a Technological World //. Oxford: Oxford University Press
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Orlikowski, W.J. (2007): "Sociomaterial practices: Exploring technology at work." // Organization Studies, // 28 (9), 1435–1448.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Orlikowski, W.J., & Scott, S.V. (2008): "Sociomateriality: Challenging the separation of technology, work and organization." // The Academy of Management Annals, // 2 (1), 433–474.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Schatzki, T.R., Knorr-Cetina, K., & von Savigny, E. (eds.) (2001): // The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory //. London: Routledge.
 * <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 14px; vertical-align: baseline; vertical-align: baseline;">Yanow, D., & Tsoukas, H. (2009): "What is reflection-in-action? A phenomenological account." // Journal of Management Studies, // 46 (8), 1331–1364.
 * # <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Learning is Heterogeneous – .... juxtapose different things – humans, individuals, nonhumans, groups, tools, belief, etc. – into assemblages that collectively perform activities. They even learned in a heterogeneous manner through heterogeneous genres and tools. || # <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Multiply linked – Because of all of the hidden passages and Hannibal’s passes at Telecorp, learning happened through multiple links to multiple people and technologies. This learning subverted the vertical integration model.
 * 1) <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Black-boxed – There was a problem with black-boxing at Telecorp. Because the various assemblages wherein work occurred had so many facets and were changing so often, the information to that needed to be transferred between actants became too idiosyncratic and specific. According to Spinuzzi to more effectively traverse the assemblages at work, more horizontal training in confidence-building and negotiation needed to be attended to. This sort of training would result in the closure of some of the more problematic black-boxes in the network.
 * 2) <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Transformative – Transformations are central to any network because they allow for new pressures (Actor-Networks) to be assembled. While Telecorp did a good job transforming texts, they did not provide for a way to transform their workers (training) so that the workers themselves would be capable of working through the associations and away from siloicmodularities. ||   ||
 * Power and ANT || <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">**Rudy, Alan. “Actor-Network Theory, Marxist Economics, and Marxist Political Ecology*.” //Capitalism Nature Socialism// 16 6 (2005): 85-90. Print.**
 * <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">The relationship between Marxism and ANT is logical because of Marxisms longtime engagement with the historical concern with relations between natures, sciences, technologies, and societies.
 * <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">ANT is characterized as a “non-modern relational mode of analysis” that isn’t comfortable with the dualisms of modernity: science-politics, subject-object, macro-micro, etc. In Marxist terms, it utilizes a materialist conception of history.
 * <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Power in ANT is a network effect – not something wielded by social individuals over objectified others or natures (87).
 * <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">Latour and ANT background many of the “sociopolitical worlds” infusing technoscience.
 * <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">ANTs goal – as articulated by Callon – is to permit “an explanation of how a few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social and natural worlds they have mobilized” (90). In this sense, ANT is an exploration of political representation and the genesis of sovereignty. ||  ||
 * <span style="background-color: #fcfcfc; color: #333333; font-family: Lato,sans-serif; font-size: 18px;">ANTs goal – as articulated by Callon – is to permit “an explanation of how a few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social and natural worlds they have mobilized” (90). In this sense, ANT is an exploration of political representation and the genesis of sovereignty. ||  ||
 * cognitivism || In the Postscript to the second edition ofLaboratory Life(1986: 280), Latour and Woolgar go as far as calling for a moratorium on cognitive explanations:”Perhaps the best way to express our position is by proposing a ten-year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science. If our French epistemologist colleagues are sufficiently confident in the paramount importance of cognitive phenomena for understanding science, they will accept the challenge. We hereby promise that if anything remains to be explained at the end of this period, we too will turn to the mind!” ||  ||
 * ANT defintion || It

attempts to shed light on artefacts that surround learners in two different learning

environments (a traditional classroom and a computer classroom), such as

computer hardware, software, stationaries, furniture, textbooks, etc., as well as

learners themselves in language classrooms to assess if inclusion of artefacts as

key players in leaning activities can reveal a better picture of learning ||  ||
 * Actor-Network Theory, which stemmed from sociology of science, || Actor-Network Theory, which stemmed from sociology of science, was mainly

developed by Callon, Latour, and Law. According to them, the society consists of

networks of any material entity, human or nonhuman, and agency (capacity to

act) of actors constitutes network, rather than mere connections of human and

nonhuman actors. Latour claims that in ANT analysis, humans are not treated

any differently from nonhumans, because “without the nonhuman, the humans

would not last for a minute (2004: 91).” ||  ||
 * Fenwick and Edwards (2010) || Fenwick and Edwards (2010) clearly explains how artefacts may relate to each

other to form a network of particular learning environment in educational settings

as follows:

Everyday things and parts of things—animals, memories, intentions,

technologies, bacteria, furniture, chemicals, plants, and so on – are

185assumed to be capable of exerting force and joining together, changing

and being changed by each other. (p. 3) Fenwick and Richards (2010) put it:

Pedagogy centres around, and is constantly mediated by, material things.

Pedagogical encounters change radically when its things change, for

example, when a PowerPoint presentation is used instead of a textbook,

or field trip to show how a pumping station works, or when desks and

chairs are removed for learning activities to explore democracy or

relationships. (p. 5) ||  ||
 * Actor-Network Theory as an analytical tool for capturing

student activities in two different class environments

Nobue T. Ellis

Waseda University || While the

traditional classroom seemed to be a better place for the students to discuss their

task in the target language, without having relevant information, the class period

can become highly unproductive. It also created a situation where students

without useful information waited for a mobile phone user to search for and

provide any information on their topic on the Internet. However, the computer

room almost prevented students to have frequent discussions as they often

worked individually, and the longer distance between students, the bulkiness of

the computers, and the noise of the room seemed to disadvantaged the students

to have comfortable interactions. ||  ||
 * Knowledge and sitributed cognition Latour and Hutchins || Latour’s (1988: 218; 226)Irreductionsalso mounted an attack on knowledge as anexplanatory concept: “Knowledge doesn’t exist – what would it be?” (…) There is no such thing as ‘knowledge.'” (A notable exception is Edwin Hutchins’s (1995) theory of distributed cognition, which was fully embraced by actor-network theory, as despite its disciplinary affiliation it made some very important contributions to understanding the role of physical artefacts in cognition, and thus furthered the programme of ANT.) ||  ||